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ABSTRACT 
The Nigerian Niger Delta region which is home to Nigeria’s large crude oil reserves, has grappled with 
many problems since the inception of crude oil explorations in the area over six decades ago. From 
environmental degradations to flagrant violation of human rights, the pitfalls of the exploration 
activities have hugely undermined the socio-economic wellbeing of the people and thereby causing 
them socio-economic injustice. 
This thesis tested how, and found that, the protracted socio-economic problems in the Niger Delta 
exemplifies Upendra Baxi’s germinal theory on the emergence (and now prevalence) of a trade-related 
and market-friendly (TREMF) paradigm that supplants human rights under the paradigm of UDHR 
in favour of assigning more rights to global capital. It then explored the potentials of the UN “Ruggie’ 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in contributing towards socio-economic justice, in 
the light of the TREMF paradigm, in the Niger Delta.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Research Outline: Conceptual Framework and Methodology 
1.1 Introduction 
Nigeria is a large country1 that is blessed with a huge amount of natural (and of course human) 
resources.2 The most vast and lucrative of all of its natural resources is crude oil which is found in the 
coastal part of the country’s southern region known as the Niger Delta.3 Nigeria’s crude oil deposits 
are ranked the 10th largest proven reserve in the world; and makes Nigeria the 12th largest producer 
and 8th largest exporter of the product in the world.4 The crude oil deposits are at present, almost 
exclusively exploited in the Niger Delta region. 
This study is necessitated by the persistence of steep social, environmental and economic pitfalls 
resulting from crude oil exploitation, and faced by the communities and peoples of the Niger Delta 
hosting them. As several reports/projects have shown, the Niger Delta environment (land, air, water 
and biodiversity) has suffered and continues to suffer grave depletion and pollution on account of 
crude oil production there.5 The human rights of the Niger Delta indigenes both individually and 
 
1 It is the largest country by population in Africa with an estimated population of 184 million people according to estimates 
on the Nigeria’s National Population Commission website accessible here http://population.gov.ng/>. However other 
fora put Nigeria population about 9 million above the NPC estimates. See < http://www.worldometers.info/world-
population/nigeria-population/>; http://countrymeters.info/en/Nigeria and < http://www.worldometers.info/world-
population/nigeria-population/>   All Accessed on January 8th 2018 
2 Nigeria has in abundance the following natural mineral resources; natural gas, iron ore, coal, limestone, lead, zinc, tin, 
niobium etc. This is according to Nigeria’s official page on the OPEC website accessible here < 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm> Accessed on 18th December 2017 
3 The Niger Delta region consists of 9 Southern Nigerian States. It draws its name from the fact that this region is the 
delta of the River Niger, which sits on the Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean. 
4 See data from OPEC at < http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm> . See also statistics from Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation at < http://nnpcgroup.com/PublicRelations/OilandGasStatistics.aspx> accessed on 
18th December 2017 
5 See this 2011 Report by the United Nations Environmental Protection UNEP, ‘Environmental Report of Ogoniland’ 
available at 
http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/CountryOperations/Nigeria/EnvironmentalAssessmentofOgonilandreport
/tabid/54419/Default.aspx Accessed on March 16th 2016  
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collectively (to life, food, safe environment, to peaceful protest/freedom of expression and so on) 
have also suffered grave abuse and or neglect as a result of crude oil exploration in the region.6  
Empirical evidence as well as astute research outputs have shown the direct link between this praxis 
of gross violations of human rights and environmental safety standards (on the one hand) and the 
emergence (on the other hand) of steep social, environmental and economic challenges; including 
agitations (violent and non-violent) that they precipitate.7  
These social, environmental and economic issues as well as their underlying human and environmental 
rights causes are collectively referred to in this study as, ‘socio-economic problems’; the mere existence or 
prevalence of which amounts to ‘socio-economic injustice’. The term ‘socio-economic justice’ will therefore be 
employed to illustrate just solutions or remedies that address the highlighted ‘socio-economic 
problems’. 
1.2 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
There are two key terms used throughout this thesis that deserve a conceptual definition. These are 
‘the Niger Delta’ and ‘socio-economic justice’. 
1.2.1 The (Nigerian) Niger Delta 
Nigeria runs a Presidential system of government in a pseudo-federalist arrangement headed by a 
President. The federating units are known as ‘states’ and there are 36 of those that make up the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria (Nigeria). These ‘states’ (or state governments) are the second tier of government 
 
6 See for instance; Martin-Joe Ezeudu, “Revisiting Corporate Violations of Human Rights in Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region: 
Canvassing the Potential Role of the International Criminal Court” (2011) 11 Afr Hum Rts LJ 23 And See Olubayo 
Oludoro “Oil Exploitation and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities”, online: Intersentia NV 
<http://intersentia.com/en/oil-exploitation-and-human-rights-violations-in-nigeria-s-oil-producing-
communities.html>.. 
7 See Lisa Stevens, ‘The Illusion of Sustainable Development: How Nigeria’s Environmental Laws are Failing the Niger 
Delta’ (2011) Vermont Law Review, Vol 36, Issue 2. 
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in Nigeria and they are headed by elected public officials with the designation of ‘Governor’. There is 
also a third tier of government known as the local government with each of the 36 state governments 
consisting of a differing number of such local governments.8 These states (and local) governments are 
further classified into six geo-political zones of North Central, North East, North West, South East, 
South South and South West.  
The Nigerian Niger Delta region is constituted by the delta areas through which the river Niger flows 
into the Atlantic Ocean. It consists of the whole six state governments which constitute the South 
South geo-political zone,9 plus two state governments in the South East geo-political zone10 and One 
state in the South West geo-political zone.11 The Niger Delta region makes up around 7.5% (about 
75,000kmsq) of Nigeria’s overall 923, 768kmsq landmass. 12 The population of the region is estimated 
at about 31 million people, representing about 16% of Nigeria’s entire population13. The region is 
richly multi-ethnic and multi-lingual with over 40 ethnic groups such as the Ijaws, the Urhobos, the 
Kalabaris, the Ikweres, the Igbos, the Itsekiris, the Efiks, the Ibibios, the Ogonis and so on. It is a 
predominantly coastal region with four distinct ecological zones of mangrove, freshwater swamp 
forests, barrier island forests and lowland rainforests.14   
 
8 For purposes of this paper, the term ‘government’ is being taken as whole and shall be deployed to refer to actions of 
federal, state or local government and those of the executives, legislators and/or judiciary within these aforementioned 
three tiers.  
9 Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Edo and Rivers States 
10 Abia and Imo states 
11 Ondo State 
12 See Federal Republic of Nigeria, Ministry of Petroleum Resources, ‘National Petroleum Policy’ (Abuja, 2017) at 41 
Available at < http://www.petroleumindustrybill.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/National-Petroleum-Policy-
Approved-by-FEC-in-July-2017.pdf> Accessed 20th January 2018 and Kaniye S. A. Ebeku, ‘Oil and the Niger Delta People in 
International Law’  Resource Rights, Environmental and Equity Issues (2006)  
13 See Federal Republic of Nigeria, Ministry of Petroleum Resources, ‘National Petroleum Policy’ (Abuja, 2017) at 41 
Available at < http://www.petroleumindustrybill.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/National-Petroleum-Policy-
Approved-by-FEC-in-July-2017.pdf> Accessed 20th January 2018 and Amnesty International, ‘Nigeria: Petroleum, 
Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta’ (London, 2009) at 9 Quoting the report of the Niger Delta Technical Committee, 
Nov. 2018 at page 102 
14 The World Bank, Defining an Environmental Development Strategy for the Niger Delta’ (2006) at vi 
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Presently, there are about 2800 producing oil wells in the Niger Delta; spread between 33 producing 
companies (and 85 operating companies).15 The region, vis-à-vis the oil and gas sector, has largely 
contributed a minimum average of 80% to the net revenue generation of the Nigerian federation since 
1974.16 This contribution however dropped to 55.4% due to the crash in global oil prices in 2014-
2015, 17 as well as the impact of the renewed agitation and attacks on oil facilities in the Niger Delta 
by the new militant group, the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) since the later part of 2015.18  
1.2.2 Socio-Economic Justice 
To define socio-economic justice, the theoretical foundation of the concept of justice relevant to this 
discourse needs to be properly outlined. In other words, we need to first, determine how we are to 
understand the foundational concept of justice.  
In his ‘Justice as Fairness’ theory, John Rawls laid out what is arguably one of the most germinal (liberal) 
theoretical conception of Justice since the 20th century.19  Rawls’ theory broke the polarising effect of 
J.S. Mill’s utilitarianist views and Marx’s communist construction and imposed itself somewhat as a 
refreshing breath of air in the field and discourse of political philosophy (cum philosophy of law). He 
thinks that the primary subject of justice is the ordering and organization of the basic structure of 
society. The Rawls’ ‘Justice as Fairness’ theory brought a refined perspective to, but however maintained 
the similar abstraction (albeit to a much higher level) of, Kant’s, Hume’s, Rousseau’s and Locke’s 
familiar social contract theories. It departs from Locke’s personal liberty (only by its second principle) 
 
15 Z Adangor, “The Petroleum Industry Bill 2012 and the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: Panacea or Placebo” (2015) 38 
JL Pol’y & Globalization [i] at 3 (48 of the text) Quoting a Department of Petroleum Resources Statistics on 2014. 
16 Adangor, supra note 15. 
17 See Central Bank of Nigeria, ‘Annual Report 2015’ (Abuja, 2015) available here 
<https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2017/RSD/Annual%20Report%202015.pdf>  at 112. 
18 Increase in global oil prices and the restoration of relative peace once again, in the region, would suggest a likelihood of 
an increase in the sector’s net revenue contribution in years 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019. 
19 Rawls J, ‘A Theory of Justice’ Rev edn (Harvard University Press, 1999) 
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and Rousseau’s social autonomy-based formulations. He however agrees with Hume in thinking that 
principles of justice are engrained in our basic nature as human beings.  
This theory considers the kind of societal structuring individual members would agree to if all of them 
started from an imaginary ‘original position’ where ‘no one knows their place in society’. All individuals 
would, at that ‘original position’, be masked by a ‘veil of ignorance’ and are therefore oblivious to what 
endowments, talents or disabilities they may possess. The original position and veil of ignorance in Rawls’ 
view, would eliminate inherent biases or penchants for marginal advantages that usually influence 
judgments/choices, and ensure a fair bargaining. Therefore, the question of this theory is in the form 
of what kind of social institutions or economic divisions or civil ordering would individuals bargain 
for and agree to at that hypothetical original position? Rawls believed that the outcome will be a 
societal ordering or organization that would be most considerate (if not favourable) to the least 
advantaged of that society. This in his view, represents ‘Justice as fairness’.20 
Rawls believed that the first principle of justice to emerge from this original position of bargaining 
would be one of equal rights and liberties.21 The second principle to emerge would be socio-economic 
Justice where:  
‘social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s 
advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all’.22 
There is no gain overstating the fact that this redistributive and socio-economic equity formulations 
of the concept and principles of justice by Rawls, is more in alignment with the precepts of this thesis 
as well as the obligations created for states under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
 
20 Rawls Supra (n19) pp10 – 18. He believes this will occur by the process of ‘reflective equilibrium’ by which individuals 
balance out two or more opposing absolutist principles to arrive at a more just and equitable decision. This is how he 
believes society can hold in equal value competition principles such as personal liberty and equal opportunity etc. 
21 Rawls (Supra) p52  
22 Ibid n19 
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paradigm. Upendra Baxi had noted that the UDHR ‘assigned human responsibilities to states…to construct, 
progressively and within the community of states, a just social order, national and global, that will at least meet the basic 
needs of human beings.23  
This redistributive aspect of Rawls’ theory drew the heaviest criticisms that have been targeted at this 
theory till date. The most prominent of these was Robert Nozick’s pragmatic libertarian theory of the 
social contract.24 Nozick kicks against any form of interventionist or redistributive paradigm but rather 
advocates a ‘night watchman’ minimalist state-type society where rights to liberty and property will be 
absolute and may only be interfered with ‘in order to avoid catastrophic moral horror’.25 
An adoption of Nozick’s model will simply amount to an adoption of the neoliberal and Laissez faire 
kind paradigm that arguably enabled the problems being discussed by this thesis in the first place. In 
any case, it is argued that the situations in the Niger Delta today have reached the threshold of the 
‘catastrophic moral horror’ upon which even the Nozickian principle permits interference for 
redistributive purposes.   
On this basis, ‘socio-economic justice’ in this context signifies measures, mechanisms and/or actions 
that are designed, in Dworkinian terms, to deal with the ‘brute luck’ consequences of crude oil 
exploration in the Niger Delta in order to foster distributive equality of resources.26    
 
 
 
 
23 Baxi U, ‘The Future of Human Rights’ (New Delhi 2002) at 139 
24 Nozick R, ‘Anarchy, State and Utopia’ (Oxford, 1974) 
25 Nozick (Supra) at 30. For more detailed critical examination of Rawls and its critiques See also Kukathas C and Petit P, 
‘Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics’ (Blackwell 1990) and Barry B, ‘The Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical Examination of the 
principal doctrines in a Theory of Justice by John Rawls’ (OUP 1973) 
26 Dworkin R, ‘Equality of Resources’ In What is Equality cap 2 (1981) Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp 283 
- 345 
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1.3 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Crude oil accounts for over 80% of Nigeria’s revenue generation and contributes over 8% to its 
GDP.27 The importance of crude oil to the country’s economy can be gleaned from this following 
illustration. In 2014/2015 at the crash of the global oil price, 27 out of Nigeria’s 36 state governments 
apparently went bankrupt due to a steep decline in their respective monthly federal revenue allocation. 
They had to rely on a financial relief package by the federal government to meet their basic 
expenditures such as payment of workers’ salaries.28 It may not be entirely out of place therefore, to 
infer that without the constant revenue from crude oil, the Nigerian state in its present economic 
structure, may likely collapse. The above fact underscores the significance of the Niger Delta region 
to Nigeria and the rest of the world where oil and gas explored from its environs are put to use.  
Production of crude oil in Nigeria began in 1958 shortly after its discovery in commercial quantity two 
years earlier in Oloibiri, a small community in the Niger Delta region. Shell-BP (as it then was), which 
was the sole concessionaire at the time, began production; pumping out a little over five thousand 
barrels (5100 bpd) per day.29 Agitations resulting from environmental, social and economic concerns 
by the indigenes began only 8 years later. The infamous revolution by the Niger Delta Volunteer Force 
led by a certain Isaac Adaka-Boro (Boro) in February 1966 became the climax of such early-stage 
agitations.30  
 
27 PWC, ‘Nigeria’s GDP Positive Signals for 2017’, available here < https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/assets/pdf/economy-
alert-march-2017.pdf> accessed January 28th 2018 
28 See The World Bank, ‘Nigeria Biannual Economic Update No 1 2017’ at p21 Available here 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/349511494584937819/pdf/114996-WP-P163291-PUBLIC-
NEUNoFinalfromPublisher.pdf> accessed 10th January 2018. See also BudgIT policy document titled ‘The State of the 
States’ (2015) available at <http://www.yourbudgit.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/THE-FATE-OF-STATES-
Final1.pdf> Accessed on January 18th 2018 
29 ‘History of the Nigerian Petroleum Industry’ available online at www.nnpcgroup.com accessed on 30th March 2016. 
30 I Okonta “The lingering crisis in Nigeria's Niger Delta and suggestions for a peaceful resolution”, available at: 
&lt;http://www.cdd.org.uk/resources/workingpapers/niger_delta_eng.htm&gt; Accessed in June   
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The objective of the revolution it would seem from Boro’s speech declaring the secession of the 
region, was to ‘draw the attention of the world to the fact that the inhabitants of the Niger Delta were feeling very 
uncomfortable . . .’ with the exploitation of crude oil from its environs without any attendant benefit to 
them.  He clarified this sentiment when he declared that ‘economic development of the [Niger Delta] area is 
certainly the most appalling . . .’ of the other regions of Nigeria.31 Boro and his force were later captured, 
tried and convicted for treason. Little was done however, by the government at that time and its 
successors to address the germane issues raised by the Boro-led agitation. 
Less than three decades later, the Ken Saro-Wiwa-led struggle, albeit a non-violent agitation under the 
auspices of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), sprung up.32 The title of 
MOSOP’s operations guiding-document alone, ‘the Ogoni Bill of Rights’ (OBoR) is instructive to 
understanding the crux of their agitation. The specific detail of their agitation is then captured in an 
eight-paragraph statement by Dr. G.B. Leton, President of MOSOP, in 1991 and contained in the 
OBoR. Dr. Leton spoke of a ‘genocide being committed . . . by Multinational Oil companies under the supervision 
of the Federal Government of Nigeria’.33 He decried the: 34 
“degrading effects of oil exploration and exploitation: lands, streams and creeks are totally and continually polluted; the 
atmosphere is for ever (sic) charged with hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide; many villages experience 
the infernal quaking of the wrath of gas flares which have been burning 24 hours a day for 33 years; acid rain, oil 
spillages and blowouts are common” 35  
 
31 See Anayochukwu Agbo, ‘Isaac Adaka-Boro, The Seven-Day Revolution in Nigeria’ available here 
<http://kayodeogundamisi.blogspot.ca/2008/02/issac-adaka-boro-seven-dat-revolution.html> at page 1 
32 Ogoni is a prominent Niger Delta tribe hosting a considerable amount of the Niger Delta Oil Exploration activities and 
therefore also bears a huge share of its environmental consequences. 
33 G. B. Leton, ‘The Ogoni Bill of Rights’ (1991) available here <http://www.bebor.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Ogoni-Bill-of-Rights.pdf> accessed 18th January 2018. By ‘genocide’ it is believed that he was 
apparently referring to the myriad of state-sponsored and conducted extra-judicial assassination of Niger Delta community 
leaders, spokespersons as well as human and environmental rights activists prevalent at the time. 
34 Ibid n 33 at p3 para 4 
35 The sum of these issues raised here, as well as the killings and the other human rights and environmental degradation 
concerns in the Niger Delta shall be brought together under the term ‘socio-economic problems/injustice’ in this work. 
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The military government of General Sanni Abacha, with the alleged collusion of Royal Dutch Shell, 
were to later round up Wiwa and eight of his MOSOP comrades on 31st October 1995. They 
subsequently tried and executed them on 10th November 1995 (hereafter ‘the Wiwa execution’). 
Perhaps the Nigerian government and Abacha in killing Wiwa et al, believed it was sending a decisive 
and clear message that would ultimately ‘tame’ all forms of agitation by the indigenes of Niger Delta. 
That clearly had not been the eventual outcome as the execution inspired a proliferation of more 
resilient and unfortunately violent, forms of agitation by the Niger Delta people.36 The Wiwa execution 
and the eventual violent agitation that it precipitated pushed the Niger Delta issues to the front-burner 
of Nigeria’s national discourse and forced the issue on the agenda of the respective governments since 
1995. 
The totality of all the solutions and strategy applied to these problems by the respective governments 
since then, has been largely inadequate. From the frequent reoccurrence of the same issues, it appears 
the said solutions are more directed towards ensuring a crude oil exploitation that is free from the 
glitches of the usual agitations than they were designed to resolve or address the underlying reasons 
for the agitations in the first place. The Obasanjo administration’s 13% oil revenue derivation to the 
Niger Delta states and its establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC); the 
Yar’Adua administration’s creation of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs and its grant of Amnesty 
(the Amnesty Initiative) to the militants of the Niger Delta region and finally, the Jonathan 
administration’s award of sumptuous security contracts to the erstwhile militant leaders to safeguard 
oil facilities, have all only brought transient successes in addressing these underlying issues. If anything, 
 
36 See this 2002 Report of the Human Rights Watch Human Rights Watch | 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th Floor | New York 
& NY 10118-3299 USA | t 12122904700, “The Niger Delta | No Democratic Dividend”, (22 October 2002), online: 
Human Rights Watch <https://www.hrw.org/report/2002/10/22/Niger Delta/no-democratic-dividend>. 
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they all secured a transient agitation-free environment for the smooth operation of the crude oil 
business at their respective times of application.  
It is not surprising that whilst these superficial efforts were in effect, more damage was being inflicted 
on the human rights and environment of the Niger Delta people and communities. Up until late 2016, 
devastating oil spillages were still being recorded.37 The latest of such records affected three Niger 
Delta states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers and particularly twelve local communities.38Similarly, 
according to the latest World Bank report (2013-2016) on the top gas flaring countries in the world, 
Nigeria ranks seventh (7th) flaring a little over 8000m cubic meters of gas annually.39  
At that rate, it is responsible for 40% of all gasses flared in the continent of Africa; the effects of which 
are localized in the environment, and borne by the people, of Niger Delta.40 In addition to those, these 
respective governments were also complicit in several incidents of violent crackdown against the 
armed militants and the wanton intimidation, framing, unlawful and indefinite detention, and 
extrajudicial killings of unarmed activists.41 All these ultimately lead to loss of lives and properties of 
many innocent and unarmed Niger Delta indigenes.  
 
37 The 2016 date refers to the last recorded/reported oil spill. It does not by no means imply that there may not have 
been more incidences of oil spillage since then, as these usually take time to get reported, recorded or acknowledged. 
38 See ‘Report of Recent Oil Spills in Delta and Bayelsa States Nigeria’, <https://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/recent-
oil-spills-in-delta-and-bayelsa-states-nigeria/>  accessed 5th May 2018 
39See World Bank’s Report on Top 30 Flaring Countries 2013-2016 available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/gasflaringreduction#7 accessed 8 April 2017  
40 See this newspaper report on the deliberations relating to the Gas Flaring Prohibition Bill 2017 before the Nigerian 
National Assembly available here< https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/06/nigeria-accounts-40-gas-flared-annually-
africa-senate/>  accessed 25th May 2018 
41 See for instance the military attack on Odi (a small Niger Delta community) under Obasanjo where a number of those 
killed are said to be in their hundreds. See a Report by Human Rights Watch on the incident, available at 
<https://www.hrw.org/legacy/press/1999/dec/nibg1299.htm> Accessed January 15th 2018. See also this report of a full 
military (Air bombardment, Land and Water invasion) ordered by then/late President Yar’Adua on the Niger Delta 
Communities <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8054585.stm>  Accessed 15th April 2018 and another report of 
military bombardment by the current administration of President Muhammadu Buhari here 
<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/11/many-feared-dead-military-bombard-militant-camp-delta/> Accessed April 
10th 2018 
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The current Buhari Administration has taken what seems to be a genuine step towards solving one of 
the key underlying causes of the agitations – pollution! It has commissioned a project to clean the 
pollutions in some of the Niger Delta communities. Preliminary report seems to suggest that 
‘remarkable achievements’ was being made in the first nine months of the cleaning operation.42 The 
Hydrocarbon Pollution Remediation Project (HYPREP) so far concentrates its cleaning operation in 
Ogoniland, which is just one of the several Niger Delta communities affected by oil Spillage.43 Perhaps 
this cleaning project offers a glimmer of hope to the inhabitants of the other communities that are 
equally ravaged by oil spillages. This hope apparently does not eradicate the sufferings occasioned by 
these spillages and it is unlikely also to extinguish the agitations they trigger. This is even more so 
because it is unclear when the cleaning project is to become operational in the other affected 
communities.  
Moreover, because the underlying regulatory and enforcement laxities permitting the spillages have 
not been addressed, there are chances of more spillages reoccurring. Such reoccurrence would no 
doubt inflict more suffering on the people, which would in turn, instigate more agitation and can 
thereby undermine the gains of the current cleaning exercise. This fear is justified given that this was 
exactly the case with the Amnesty Initiative. This present administration terminated the program in 
December of 2017 after extending it by two years from its original terminal date.44 However, the 
underlying socio-economic issues that fuelled the violence of the militants had still not been addressed. 
It was perhaps not surprising when the relative peace achieved by the Amnesty program was truncated 
 
42 See the News Conference by the Hydrocarbon Pollution Remediation Project (HYPREP) on the Progress of the 
Cleaning here http://ndnewvision.gov.ng/ogoni-clean-up-hyprep-gives-progress-report/ Accessed 14th April 2018 
43 HYPREP is the Joint Federal Government and Shell B.P Venture company in charge of the cleaning project.  
44 There is currently immense pressure on the administration to allow the program to run further. See for instance this 
report by Frank Ikpefan on the Nations Newspaper of 23rd January 2018, available here  
<http://thenationonlineng.net/Niger Delta-youths-to-buhari-extend-amnesty-programme/> accessed 10th February 
2018 
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almost immediately by the emergence of a new vicious militant group by the name of Niger Delta 
Avengers (NDA).  
The NDA just like the others before it, demanded government’s immediate remedy to address the 
same (or similar) socio-economic problems highlighted earlier. It has maintained its existence through 
the release of press statements and by sustaining its pattern of sporadic and infrequent attacks on oil 
installations since then.45 This puts a big question mark on the sustainability and durability of the 
purported achievements of the Amnesty program.46 These patterns of re-emergence/reoccurrence of 
‘old’ problems in the Niger Delta situation strengthens the theory that the sustainability and durability 
of any solution must lie in its ability to address the underlying socio-economic problems fuelling the 
agitations.  
Many scholars believe that the panacea to these underlying socio-economic issues lies ultimately in a 
supranational remedy.47 The Wiwa execution, aside from forcing the issues of the Niger Delta into the 
Nigerian national discourse, also inspired conversations within the international realm. It clearly 
impeached the adequacy of the international human rights law regime as is currently constituted, in 
dealing with business-related human rights violations. It thereby also inspired an International policy 
and scholarly renaissance in seeking ways to address the dire effects of business corporations and their 
activities on human rights. Within the supranational framework of the United Nations, it reinvigorated 
efforts at evolving a code of conduct for Multinational and Transnational corporations (MNCs and 
TNCs). These efforts first led to the production of the controversial and now defunct ‘UN Norms on 
 
45 See this Guardian Newspaper report for instance available here <https://guardian.ng/opinion/the-threat-by-Niger 
Delta-avengers/> and accessed on April 10th 2018 
46 See Sabella O. Abidde, ‘Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Militancy, Amnesty and the Postamnesty Environment (Lexington London, 2017) 
pp69 – 128 For a more critical discourse on this point 
47 See Oyeniyi Abe, “The Feasibility of Implementing the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights in the Extractive Industry in Nigeria” (2016) 7 J Sustainable Dev L & Pol’y 137; Ezeudu, supra note 6; Evaristus 
Oshionebo, “Stabilization Clauses in Natural Resource Extraction Contracts: Legal, Economic and Social Implications for 
Developing Countries” (2010) 10 Asper Rev Int’l Bus & Trade L 1. 
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the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regards to 
Human Rights’ (The Norm)48 and prompted the eventual emergence of the UN ‘Ruggie’ Business and 
Human Rights ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework (the framework) and its Guiding Principles 
(the GPs).49  
In the light of the above discussed background, it is the task of this research to assess if the UN 
framework and the GPs possess real potentials for the attainment of socio-economic justice for the 
people of the Niger Delta.  
1.4 A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE UN ‘RUGGIE’ FRAMEWORK 
AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
The Wiwa execution, it is believed, provided the tipping point in the struggle and search for socio-
economic justice by the people and communities of the oil-producing Niger Delta region of Nigeria.50 
It pushed the Niger Delta issues to the front burner of Nigerian national discourses (and it seems to 
have remained there), ushering in some of the significant governmental interventions in recent years 
such as the granting of a 13% derivation revenue to the oil-producing Niger Delta state governments 
in Nigeria and the creation of key government ministries (e.g. Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs) and 
agencies (e.g. Niger Delta Development Commission).  
 
48 See a. Commission on Human Rights, ‘Joint Views of the IOE and ICC on the Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ UN Doc. E/CN.4. Sub. 2. 
2003/NGO/44 (29th July 2003) b. D. Kinley, J. Nolan and N. Zerial, ‘Reflections on the United Nations Human Rights 
Norms for Corporations’ (2007) 25(1) Companies and Securities Law Journal 30 See Also Commission on Human Rights, 
‘Report on the Sixtieth Session (!5th March – 23rd April 2003)’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/127, Part 1, ch. 42, p. 28, para. C 
49 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (New York and Geneva 2011) at 
p.1 Available at <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf>  last 
accessed on January 26th 2018 
50 The term Socio-economic justice would be deployed in this work to represent that availability/attainment and enjoyment 
of better human rights protection/respect and environmental cleanliness/safety while socio-economic injustice would 
represent the lack thereof of these. 
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Internationally, it may have also contributed to the turning point in the international discourse on the 
responsibility of MNCs and TNCs, with respect to human rights given the proximity of its occurrence 
to some of the notable developments in the global Business and Human Rights debates. 51  This was 
after several failures by the defunct UN Commission (and Centre) on Transnational Corporations 
(UNCTC) to produce an ‘acceptable’ Draft Code of conduct for TNCs in 1983, 1988 and 1993. The 
subsequent disbandment of the UNCTC itself by the then United Nations Secretary General, Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, appeared to have diminished the prospect of regulating MNCs and TNCs on the 
supranational level.  
However, the Wiwa execution and particularly, the alleged complicity of transnational oil giant, Royal 
Dutch Shell, appear to have re-enacted the expression of concerns and debates about the need to 
regulate the activities of MNCs and TNCs. 52 It also mainstreamed human rights as an integral aspect 
of the wider concerns/debates on the need to regulate TNCs and pushed it to the forefront of that 
debate agenda.53 The human rights angle, it can be argued, provided the effective vehicle for moving 
the debates and conversations forward into the realm of taking actions and seeking solutions. Because 
according to Baxi; “human rights languages are all that we have to interrogate the barbarism of 
power”.54  
 
51 See for instance Florian Wettstein, ‘From Side Show to Main Act: Can Business and Human Rights Save Corporate 
Responsibility’ in J Nolan & D. Baumann-Pauly (ed), ‘Business and Human Rights From Principles to Practice’ (Routledge London 
& New York, 2016) at 78 
52 There has been an ongoing effort within the framework of United Nations to regulate the conducts and activities of 
MNCs and TNCs starting from around 1972 with UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Resolution 1721 calling 
for ‘a study of the role of MNCs and their impact on the process of development’. See Khoury S & Whyte D, ‘Corporate 
Human Rights Violations’ (2017, Routledge) c 1, pp 24 - 43 
53 Human Rights had not been the primary objective of the UN efforts (from the 70s) to evolve a code of conduct to 
regulate the activities and conducts of MNCs and TNCs. It was rather to curb their alleged Interference with sovereignty 
of nation-states arising from the complaint of the then Chilean Leader Salvador Allende, accusing American corporation 
ITT, of attempting to undermine Cuban sovereignty and instigate a military take-over. See Khoury S & Whyte D, ‘Corporate 
Human Rights Violations’ (2017, Routledge) c 1, pp 24 - 43 
54 Upendra Baxi, ‘Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights’ (1998) 8 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 125, 
170 
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One of such solution-seeking initiatives came by way of setting up a five-member working group in 
1998 by the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, to ‘draft Norms . . . on the responsibilities of 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regards to human rights’ (the Norms).55 There was 
also a parallel effort through the office of the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in the form of 
the Global Compact (GC) initiative which was established in 2000.  The GC enjoined corporations to 
voluntarily adopt and abide by a set of 10 principles on human rights, labour rights, the environment 
and anti-corruption in their business activities.56 
The norms did not have the blessing nor imprimatur of the stakeholders (mostly the corporations and 
their powerful Global North home states)57 because it attempted to impose a binding human rights 
obligation on corporations.  Consequently, vigorous opposition was mounted against the adoption of 
the norms from the business community and their powerful Global North home states. Following 
such oppositions, the then United Nations (UN) Human Rights Commission (now the Human Rights 
Council) in 2005 decided to discontinue all debates relating to the controversial UN Norms.58 This 
effectively ended the ‘life’ of these norms. 
At the request of the Commission, the UN Secretary General appointed a Special Representative of 
the Secretary General (SRSG) on Human Rights, Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises in the person of Harvard Professor John Ruggie.59 The key mandate of the SRSG was to 
 
55 See UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Res/1998/8 (20th August 1998), para. 4 
56 See UN Global Compact available at <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/> Accessed on 10th January 2018 
57 Notably the US, the UK and Australia 
58 See a. Commission on Human Rights, ‘Joint Views of the IOE and ICC on the Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ UN Doc. E/CN.4. Sub. 2. 
2003/NGO/44 (29th July 2003) b. D. Kinley, J. Nolan and N. Zerial, ‘Reflections on the United Nations Human Rights 
Norms for Corporations’ (2007) 25(1) Companies and Securities Law Journal 30 See Also Commission on Human Rights, 
‘Report on the Sixtieth Session (!5th March – 23rd April 2003)’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/127, Part 1, ch. 42, p. 28, para. C 
59 See UN Human Rights Resolution 2005/69, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/69 (20th April 2005)  
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clarify the standards of human rights-related responsibility that transnational corporations and other 
business entities have.60 
In 2008, the SRSG developed the Business and Human Rights normative ‘framework’ hinged on the 
three pillars of ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ (the framework).61 The Human Rights Council (HRC) 
adopted this framework in the same 2008. By 2011, the SRSG evolved a set of Guiding Principles (the 
GPs) meant to provide guidance on how to ‘operationalize’ the three-pillar framework.62 The 
framework and GPs seemed to enjoy a much broader support amongst the stakeholders within the 
business community and governments in the Global North but not necessarily so within governments 
or states in the Global South63. 
The Guiding Principles were adopted by the HRC in June 2011 and a Working Group64 who are ‘to 
promote the effective and comprehensive dissemination and implementation of the Guiding Principles’ was appointed.65 
The central theme of the working group’s strategy is to engage with member states and encourage 
them to develop, enact and update a National Action Plan (NAP) on Business and Human Rights.66  
1.5 THE RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
The pattern of reoccurrence and re-emergence of the agitations in the Niger Delta is suggestive of the 
unsustainability of the solutions and remedies so far adopted. The said unsustainability can be ascribed 
 
60 Ibid n2 
61 See United Nations Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5. 7 April 2008 
62 The terms ‘pillar’ and ‘framework’ shall be deployed interchangeably to refer to the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
nomenclature of the UN Business and Human Rights Framework. Also, the term ‘Business Enterprises’ or “corporations” 
or “business(es)” shall be used in this paper holistically to represent all forms of corporations or businesses; transnational, 
multinational, national or by whatsoever name they are known in the business and human rights fora. 
63 Evidence of this apparent lack of real support by the Global South states follows from the 2014 Resolution authored 
by Ecuador that passed within the UN Human Rights Commission aimed at formulating a binding instrument in 
International Human Rights Law, to regulate the activities of TNCs and also make them accountable  
64 A Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises.  
65 Human Rights Council, ‘Human Rights and Transnational Corporation and Other Business Enterprises’, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/17/4 (6 July 2011), para. 6(a) 
66 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘State National Action Plans’, accessible from < 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx> accessed on 30th November 2017 
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to the failures of the solutions themselves (or their not being designed) to address the underlying issues 
fuelling the agitations.67 It follows reasonably therefore, that failing to address those underlying socio-
economic problems problematizes the prospects of achieving any sustainable or durable solution to 
the Niger Delta agitations, be they violent or non-violent. This research attempts to contribute towards 
the achievement of such a solution to, not just the violence but, the underlying socio-economic 
problems fuelling them.  
To achieve that aim, the research intends to (as it thinks there is a compelling need to so do), take a 
step back and aim for a shift towards a critical and more innovative study of the underlying socio-
economic problems that incite the Niger Delta agitations, through the examination of the background 
forces (or factors) breeding them. In other words, it goes beyond merely theorizing about either the 
nature and forms of those underlying problems (e.g.  human rights violations and environmental 
degradation etc.), or formulating theoretically sound but impractical solutions, to examining through 
the critical lens of its theoretical framework, the background forces behind the emergence and 
prevalence of those underlying (socio-economic) problems in the first place.  
Understanding these (background) forces is the first and critical step towards evolving a truly 
sustainable and durable solution to the said socio-economic problems. This informed the choice of 
Upendra Baxi’s germinal theory on the emergence of a ‘trade-related, market-friendly’ (TREMF) 
paradigm of international human rights, as the key theoretical framework for this research.68 Baxi 
argued that these emergent TREMF paradigm of human rights, pushed by the forces of economic 
globalization, are supplanting the UDHR paradigm that privileged individual human beings, while 
 
67 Professor Ruggie believes that this is as a result of what he termed ‘governance gaps’ created by the forces of Capital or 
economic ‘globalization’. See UNHRCOR, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights: 
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General [SRSG] on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie’ (2008) UN Doc A/HRC/8/5. At 3 
68 See Upendra Baxi, ‘The Future of Human Rights’ (New Delhi 2006) p 234 – 275. This theory forms the key theoretical 
framework for this research and is developed fully in the section on Theoretical and Methodological framework below. 
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assigning more rights to the MNCs and TNCs.69 The theory is considered particularly germane because 
of its interconnectedness to the subject matter of this research. It is, just like this research, premised 
upon interrogating the impacts of market, business or trade forces (vis-à-vis economic globalisation) 
on the UDHR paradigm of human rights. Aside this reason of interconnectedness, there is also the 
reason of novelty in deploying the theory in this specific Niger Delta context to profile the forms, 
sources and origins of the background forces that fuel and protract the socio-economic problems in 
the region.  
With that said, the specific objective of this research is to examine the extent to which the UN 
framework and the GPs are equipped or are able to make a significant (positive) contribution towards 
the search for socio-economic justice in the Niger Delta.  
1.6 THE RESEARCH QUESTION  
Given the detailed context and research problem laid out above, the specific but broad question that 
this thesis tackles is “to what extent can the UN framework and Guiding Principles (GPs) play a significant role 
in attaining Socio-economic Justice in the Nigerian Niger Delta region?” 
This broad research question entails the following sub-questions: 
i. What socio-economic injustices exist within the crude oil exploration sector in the Nigerian 
Niger Delta and what gives rise to them? 
ii. What is the potential of the GPs in helping to achieve sustainable socio-economic justice in 
the region?  
iii. What, if any, are the likely obstacles to the successful application of the GPs in the 
circumstances and how may those obstacles (if any) be circumvented? 
 
69 Baxi note 68 
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iv. What lessons emerge from the (lack of) deployment or application of the GPs in this specific 
Niger Delta context that support or impeach the debate for or against a binding international 
business and human rights treaty? 
1.7 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS  
This thesis is divided into four (4) chapters. The first chapter, chapter One (which is this Chapter) sets 
out the Conceptual and Methodological framework of this study. The conceptual framework discusses 
the research problem and the research aim and objectives. It also explains how the thesis is organised 
and presents an outline of the research questions. The Methodological framework part of the chapter 
discusses the theoretical framework and methodology of the study.  
Chapter Two provides a background of the socio-economic problems/injustices occasioned by crude 
oil exploitation in the Niger Delta region. It then assesses how the socio-economic problems 
highlighted either exemplify or trouble the sub-claims that emerge from the Baxian TREMF theory. 
It utilises some specific actions or decisions of the Nigerian government (the executive, legislature and 
the Judiciary) and certain key incidents in the Niger Delta agitations as case studies.   
Chapter three assesses the potentiality and prospects of the UN framework and GPs in ameliorating 
the lived experiences and plights (to wit socio-economic injustices) of the people and communities of 
the Niger Delta. In other words, this chapter attempts to answer the question of how, or in what way, 
can the UN framework and the GPs help to improve or achieve sustainable socio-economic justice in 
the Niger Delta. In doing so, it lays out the likely obstacles (if any) to the successful application of the 
UN framework and its GPs to the specific circumstances of the Niger Delta issues.  
Chapter four, the final chapter, concludes by making recommendations on how the obstacles 
identified in chapter three, and the background TREMF forces identified in chapter two, may be 
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circumvented to achieve (howbeit minimal), socio-economic justice for the people and communities 
of the Nigerian Niger Delta region. 
1.8 LITERATURE REVIEW  
1.8.1 Relevant Scholarly Conversations on the International Stage 
There is presently a sharp division amongst scholars, practitioners, activists and UN member states 
alike on what is the best way forward towards achieving a sustainable protection of human rights from 
the adverse impacts of business/corporate activities.  
Within the UN, there is the group of nations who continue to express faith in the United Nations 
(UN) frameworks and the Guiding Principles (GPs).70 They seem to see the framework and the GPs 
as an end in themselves.  Prominent within this group are the OECD/EU member states and the US. 
These can also be categorized, a la Ruggie, as the ‘home countries of the vast majority of the World’s 
transnational corporations’.71 
There is also the second group dominated by Global South states (and you may say, led by Ecuador) 
who are adamant about the inadequacy of the framework and the GPs and are regarding them as a 
means to an end at best or a continuation of business as usual or perpetuation of status quo at worst.72 
This group have now pushed through the passage of a UN Human Rights Council resolution for the 
possible formulation of “a legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities 
 
70 See http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf 
71 J. G. Ruggie “Quo Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and Human Rights Treaty Sponsors - Commentary |”, online: 
<https://www.ihrb.org/other/treaty-on-business-human-rights/quo-vadis-unsolicited-advice-to-business-and-human-
rights-treaty-sponsors>. 
72 See Mauricio Montalvo (Ecuador), (Address to the UN Human Rights Council, delivered at 
the Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, 16 June 2011) <webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/ 
conferences/unhrc/seventeenth/hrc110616pm3-eng.rm?start=00:13:33&end=00:16:32>; and the 
comments of the South African representative (UN Human Rights Council, Information Release 
(not an official record), ‘Council holds dialogue with Experts on summary executions, independence 
of judges and lawyers, transnational corporations’ (30 May 2011) <www.ohchr.org/EN/ 
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11082&LangID=E)> (accessed 3 September 
2011)) 
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of multinational corporation and other business enterprises” .73 An Inter-Governmental Working Group 
(IGWG) has been set up and tasked with delivering on this mandate.  
In the scholarly arena, there seems to be more agreement than disagreement, that the GPs are not an 
end in themselves.74 Cata Backer leans towards this position in his assessment. 75 To him, the 
framework and GPs’ greatest achievement was their ‘elaboration of a corporate governance framework that is 
meant to apply concurrently with corporate obligations under the laws of the jurisdictions . . .’ in which the 
corporations operate. 76  
Justine Nolan in his edited volume with D. Baumann-Pauly puts it more succinctly when he opined 
that “The Guiding Principles reaffirm the relevance of all human rights to business but do not end the debate on how 
best to address and redress corporate violations of human rights”.77 
Where there is a lack of consensus is on the approach or mechanism by which the desired end/goal 
(which is effective human rights protection from and against business-related violations) should be 
attained. Ruggie, while not being totally averse to the idea of a binding treaty, believes that a consistent 
and committed application of the GPs will go a long way towards alleviating business-related human 
rights violations as well as enthroning a culture of respect for human rights within corporations.78  
 
73 Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 (25 June 2014)  
74 See P. Simons, ‘ International Law’s Invisible Hand and the Future of Corporate Accountability for Violations of Human 
Rights Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, Vol. 3 No. 1, March 2012, pp. 5–43; P Muchlinski, ‘ Implementing 
the New UN Corporate Human Rights Framework: Implications for Corporate Law, Governance and Regulations 
Business Ethics Quarterly (2012) 22:1 p145-177 and R Blitt, ‘ Beyond Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Charting an Embracive Approach to Corporate Human  Rights Compliance TILJ Vol 38 Issue 1 
75 Larry Cata Backer, ‘On the Evolution of the United Nations’ “Protect-Respect-Remedy” Project: The State, the 
Corporation and Human Rights in a Global Governance Context’ (2011) 9 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 37. 
76 Larry Cata Backer (Supra) at p 75. 
77 J Nolan & D. Baumann-Pauly (ed), ‘Business and Human Rights from Principles to Practice’ (Routledge London & New York, 
2016) at 44 
78 See his position  Ibid n71. 
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Bittle and Snider79, Karp80 and Deva81  were rather in disagreement with Ruggie. Bittle and Snider on 
the one hand, are pessimistic that the voluntarism espoused by the framework and GPs would unlikely 
engender any positive change in corporate cultures for better respect of human rights.82 Karp shared 
similar view when he criticized the framework and GPs’ equation of the responsibility to respect 
human rights with the ‘to do no harm’ principle; arguing that in doing so, the framework had undercut 
its own potential for making any real impact.83Deva on the other hand believed that the framework 
and the GPs are more deferential to corporate interest than the interest of victims for better protection 
of rights. He opined that the process leading up to the evolution and adoption of the framework and 
GPs had undermined their potentials given their inadequate consultation of victims of corporate 
human rights violations.84  
Stef Khoury and David Whyte expressed similar sentiments or criticism in their work.85 They 
dismissed the multi-stakeholder support purported to have been attained by the adoption of the 
framework and GPs as “a Fake Consensus”86. They branded it a ‘continuation of a business friendly 
agenda’ which failed to fill up the ‘space between the laws’87 and which was designed more to 
‘reconcile’ the US and the business community with the business and human rights bureaucratic 
 
79 S Bittle & L Snider, ‘Examining the Ruggie Report: can voluntary guidelines tame global capitalism?’ in Critical 
Criminology, (2013) vol. 21 
80 David J. Karp, Responsibility for Human Rights, Transnational Corporations in Imperfect States’, (Cambridge University Press, 
2014) 
81 S. Deva 'Treating human rights lightly: A critique of the consensus rhetoric and the language employed by the Guiding 
Principles', online: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287055480_Treating_human_rights_lightly_A_critique_of_the_consensus_r
hetoric_and_the_language_employed_by_the_Guiding_Principles>  
82 S Bittle & L Snider n79 pp 177-192 
83 David J. Karp n80 at pp 82 - 87 
84 S. Deva (Supra) ibid n81 at 83 - 84 
85 S Khoury & D Whyte, ‘Corporate Human Rights Violations’ (Routledge, 2017) 65 - 76 
86 Emphasis mine 
87 Adopting the term used by Michalowski and Kramer (1987) to describe the situation whereby corporations exploit the 
gaps between international and national legal or regulatory regimes. See Michalowski R. and Kramer R.,’ The Space 
Between the Laws: The Problem of Corporate Crime in a Transnational Context’ In Social Problem (1987) Vol. 34, No. 
1 pp 34 -53 
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architecture of the United Nations.88  In what seemed similar to the ‘space between the laws’ criticism 
of Khoury and White89, Simmons, while concentrating largely on the framework’s ‘protect’ pillar, has 
criticized Ruggie for glossing over the “governance gaps created by globalization” which he (Ruggie) had 
himself, identified to be the ‘root cause’ of the rampant business related human rights violations.90  
Professor Ruggie had indicted globalization in his preliminary prognosis, arguing that it “creates a 
permissive environment for the wrongful acts by companies”, but failed to make any recommendations as to how 
the so called ‘governance gaps’ are to be addressed.91 To address this, Simons has argued for the 
inclusion of human rights protective clauses in the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) governing the 
operations of the Multinational and Transnational Corporations (MNCs &TNCs).92  
Muchlinski, whose work centred on an analysis of the ‘respect’ framework, highlighted the difficulties 
imposed by the framework in the light of the primacy of shareholder model of corporate governance. 
93 He then canvassed for “a more stakeholder oriented approach” to be adopted by corporate actors in their 
governance and regulatory schemes as a more realistic way of achieving the responsibility placed on 
them by the ‘respect’ framework.94  
Blitt’s recommendations centre mainly on access to remedy. 95 He foresaw that the persistent debates, 
advocacy and activism by civil society, as well as efforts within the UN and on the domestic fronts of 
 
88 Ibid n 85 at 52 - 60 
89 Ibid n 85 
90 Penelope Simons, “International Law’s Invisible Hand and the Future of Corporate Accountability for Violations of 
Human Rights” (2011) 3 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment at 8., ‘. 
91 UNHRCOR, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights: Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General [SRSG] on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises, John Ruggie’ (2008) UN Doc A/HRC/8/5. At 3 
92 Simons, supra note 90 at 32–40. 
93 See P Muchlinski, ‘Implementing the New UN Corporate Human Rights Framework: Implications for Corporate Law, 
Governance and Regulation’ 22 Business Ethics Quarterly 145 (2012) 
94 Muchlinski supra ibid n 93 at 162 
95 R Blitt, ‘Beyond Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Charting an Embracive Approach to 
Corporate Human Rights Compliance TILJ Vol 38 Issue 1  
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its member nations, may end in evolving “a more binding legal requirement on corporations to respect human 
rights”.96 He proposed what he termed a ‘third option’ whereby corporations take a more pre-emptive 
and proactive approach that seeks “out higher grounds by complying with all applicable human rights treaty 
norms”.97 He cited the growing uncertainties within the judicial arena as a reason for them to do this.98  
Many of these scholarly interventions still revolve around the issue of voluntarism - the continued 
trust in the forthrightness of corporations to do what they are expected. This has certainly failed (so 
far) to yield the desired result. This lack of faith in the voluntary mechanism of the framework and 
the GPs may have informed the decision of some other scholars/policymakers (e.g. Nolan, Khoury, 
Ganesan, Pitt, Wettstein99 and so on) to express their supports for the evolution of a binding 
Corporate Human Rights Treaty. They have taken the debates a step further and have ultimately 
aligned their views with that of the Ecuador-group state members within the UN. 
 In his own contribution in the Nolan/Baumann-Pauly edited volume, Pitts re-echoed the seemingly 
prevailing sentiment of a more expansive and interactive ‘multi-pronged, multi-stakeholder approach’ in the 
search for an effective prevention and redress mechanism for corporate human rights violations.100 
He however went further to opine that such approach should include ‘hard and soft law, incentives and 
values and corporate culture’.101  
 
96 R Blitt supra ibid n95 at page 57 
97 Ibid at p95 
98 There are pending cases across the world including one pending currently pending before the Supreme Court of the 
United States (Jesner v Arab Bank) on the applicability of the Alien Tort Statute to corporate impunity and human rights 
violations committed outside the US by corporations with parental presence in the US such as the Arab Bank. 
99 Who advocated the integration of the principles of Corporate Social Responsibility and that of Business and Human 
Rights in her contribution in J Nolan & D. Baumann-Pauly (ed), ‘Business and Human Rights from Principles to Practice’ 
(Routledge London & New York, 2016) pp 84 - 86  
100 J Nolan & D. Baumann-Pauly (Supra) pp 51 - 60 
101 Ibid at page 60 (Emphasis mine) 
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Nolan was more lucid in his campaign for a binding treaty.102 After taking into account the counter-
points marshalled by those opposed to the prospect of a binding treaty, he concluded that “neither the 
length of the treaty drafting process nor the complexity of the process is a sufficient reason to derail the process at this 
stage”.103 He also added that even a Business and Human Rights Treaty would need to be applied in 
concert with other multi-stakeholder efforts already in place or being developed.104  
The singular most important feature emanating from this prevalent scholarly narrative is the verdict 
that both the framework and the GPs are a means at best, and certainly not an end in themselves, to 
the menace of corporate human rights violations. Innovative attempts through extraterritorial 
litigation for instance, to procure accountability for corporate activities or conducts resulting in human 
rights violations have also largely been unsuccessful.105 That lack of success lends more credence to 
the need and necessity of a binding treaty. These, on their own head, make the discourse of this 
research even more relevant in enriching the current debate on what the way forward should be.  
1.8.2 Scholarly Conversations at the Domestic or National Stage 
Prior and post the Guiding Principles, the issue of the Nigerian Niger Delta has remained topical 
among scholarly, activist and socio-economic and political conversations. Majority of the scholarly 
work on this subject area are primarily focused on either analysing the ways in which crude oil 
production impacts the lives and wellbeing of the Niger Delta people (the rights violations, 
 
102 J Nolan & D. Baumann-Pauly (Supra) p70 - 73 
103 Ibid n 77 at page 72 
104 Ibid 77 at page 72  
105 Khulumani v Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd, 504 F.3d 254, 264 (2nd Cir. 2007). For Unsuccessful judicial attempts See Kiobel v 
Royal Dutch Shell BP in the US (about the Nigerian Ogoni 9 killing and Shell’s involvement in it. Although Shell ultimately 
settled out of court); See also Bodo Community & Others v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nig Ltd [2014] EWHC 2170 
(TCC) in the UK (it is partly successful because the court ruled that the case could proceed but Shell elected to settle out 
of court); and also HRH Emere Godwin Bebe Okpabi & Others v Royal Dutch Shell & Anor [2017] EWHC 89 (TCC) and Anvil 
Mining Ltd. V Association Canadienne Contre L’Impunite N°500-09-021701-115 
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environmental degradations up till the violent agitations and crackdown etc) or providing conceptual 
or theoretical solutions to remedy the situation.  
For instance, Ezeudu had explored the possibility of applying the International Criminal Court’s 
jurisdiction/jurisprudence to check and punish the impunities committed by the oil MNCs and TNCs 
in the Niger Delta.106 Adewumi and Olatubosun echoed similar sentiments as Muchlinski107 in their 
call for increased stakeholder participation as a recipe for sustainable solution to the Niger Delta 
issues.108 Ebeku has advocated for domestication and implementation of international legal 
frameworks such as the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Kyoto Protocol to 
the Niger Delta context109, while Nliam advocates for the “application of the precautionary 
principle”.110  
Rhuks Ako has made a case for the repeal or amendment of Nigeria’s Land Use Act which vested 
radical title in all lands within the Nigerian Federation on the federal, state and local governments, as 
one means of restoring ‘environmental justice’ for the Niger Delta People.111 Ako’s position was 
reiterated by Oludoro who faulted an ‘inadequate legal framework’ for the socio-economic pitfalls in 
the Niger Delta and recommended granting more access and participation in decision-making 
processes to the people as a panacea.112 Edu was of the opinion that the panacea to the Niger Delta 
 
106 Martin-Joe Ezeudu, “Revisiting Corporate Violations of Human Rights in Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region: Canvassing 
the Potential Role of the International Criminal Court” (2011) 11 Afr Hum Rts LJ 23 
107 See P Muchlinski supra n93 
108 Afolasade A Adewumi & Adeniyi Olatunbosun, “Enhancing Stakeholder Participation in the Niger Delta Region: The 
Potential Contributions of the ILO Convention 169” (2015) 6 J Sustainable Dev L & Pol’y 129. 
109 K. S. A. Ebeku, ‘Biodiversity Conservation in Nigeria: An Appraisal of the Legal Regime in Relation to the Niger Delta 
Area of the Country’, 16(3) Journal of Environmental Law (2004): 361-75, at 366 
110 Sylvester Oscar Nliam, ‘International Oil and Gas Environmental Legal Framework and the Precautionary Principle: 
the Implications for the Niger Delta’ [2014] 22 African Journal of International Comparative Law available < 
http://www.euppublishing.com/action/doSearch?AllField=Sylvester+Oscar+Nliam&x=6&y=4> accessed 8th March 
2016 
111 Rhuks Ako, ‘Nigeria’s Land Use Act: An Anti-thesis to Environmental Justice’ (2009) JAL (2)  
112 O. Oludoro, ‘Oil Exploitations and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities’ Open Journal 
Systems Vol. 25 No.2 (2012) 
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issues lay in more committed and adequate discharge of Corporate Social Responsibility by the 
Multinational Oil Companies.113  
Zalik, had applied the illuminating ‘trilemma triangle’ theory on the future of oil propounded by Shell 
in its Global Scenarios to 2025 publication to evaluate the violence triggered by the socio-economic 
injustice in the Niger Delta.114 She highlighted how the ‘Low Trust Globalization’ scenarios characterised 
by coercion, restriction and command and control measures of the state continues to undermine the 
‘Flags’  scenario characterized by the ‘force of community’ seeking inclusion in the economic process 
and fairer redistribution of the socio-economic means.115 Building upon that theory, Egede advocated 
for ‘trade-offs’ between the ‘Low Trust Globalization’ scenario and the ‘Flags’ scenario in the Niger Delta 
so as to achieve the ‘Open Doors’ scenario that would be “founded on trust of the global system and globalization 
process”.116 He believes this could be achieved via a tripartite contractual agreement where the oil-
producing communities are involved with the state and the oil MNCs, thereby giving the  communities 
‘a sense of ownership’ in the oil exploration venture.117 
Lugard, in his own contribution, proffered a theoretical solution framework based on the ‘collective 
property’ rights theory (as opposed to the individual property rights) whereby the rights of the oil 
MNCs will be made subject to the ‘overriding interests of other stakeholders including host 
 
113 O K Edu, “Corporate Social Responsibility: The Case of Multinational Oil Companies in the Niger Delta of Nigeria” 
(2011) 23 Sri Lanka J Int’l L 101. 
114 Anna Zalik, Oil 'Futures': Shelik Scenarios and the Social Constitution of the Global 
Oil Market, 41 GEOFORUM 553, 558 (2009) 
115 Zalik (Supra) ibid n114  
116 Hephzibah Egede; Edwin Egede, ‘The Force of the Community in the Niger Delta of Nigeria: Propositions for New 
Oil and Gas Legal and Contractual Arrangements’, 25 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 45, 88 (2016) at 57 
117 See Egede Supra ibid n116 at page 87-88 
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communities’.118 Such interests would then include the overriding interest of the communities to a safe 
and healthy environment among other things.119  
What emerges from this modest outline of the relevant literature is the abundance both theoretically 
and conceptually, of plausible solutions to the earlier discussed Niger Delta problems. The fact of the 
non-adoption or implementation of the said solutions by the Nigerian government to deal with what 
is obviously the most prominent problem militating against its economic prosperity, underlines the 
severity of these background forces identified as one of the key problems that inspired this research.  
The originality of this research is embedded in its novel approach of applying the Baxian TREMF 
theory in analysing the underlying socio-economic issues in the Niger Delta. The research’s originality 
is also reflected in its adoption of the TREMF theory in critiquing the practical applicability of the 
UN framework and GPs to real-life business and human rights debacles exemplified by the Niger 
Delta paradigm in discourse. The application of the theory illuminates how the root cause(s) of the 
problems are well beyond the clichés of ‘government corruption’ and/or ‘lack of political will to act’. 
By so doing, it redirects the conversations and debates back to the appropriate root of the problem, 
from where an efficacious articulation of a solution is most likely to evolve. 
Scholars who have ventured into this aspect of the Niger Delta questions (i.e. studying the underlying 
causes of the socio-economic issues) have always either ended up heaping the blame on the clichés of 
‘government corruption’, ‘lack of political will’ or merely highlighted the effects or the forms in which 
the background forces manifest. Take for an instance, Abe’s work which is conceptually similar to this 
research in its use of the UN ‘Ruggie’ Guiding Principles in theorizing a solution to the Niger Delta 
 
118 S.N. Lugard “The clash of property and environmental rights in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria | Lugard | Journal 
of Sustainable Development Law and Policy (The)”, online: 
<https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jsdlp/article/view/140512>. 
119 Ibid at 118. 
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issues, falls in the former category.120 Abe treated the UN framework and Guiding Principles as though 
their recommendations were sacrosanct and binding, or as though they are the first of its kind to 
exhort protection and respect for human rights.  
Although Abe acknowledged the failures of the past international human rights instruments such as 
the UDHR, the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to address the prevalent governance 
gaps and influence better protection of the rights of the Niger Delta people. He however, puts these 
failures down to ‘government corruption’ and ‘lack of political will’. This research considers the often 
indictment of these clichés such as ‘government corruption’ and/or ‘lack of political will’ as being the 
reasons behind these failures, however convenient it is to do so, to be rather too simplistic. It argues 
that such clichés or terms are rather the manifestations of the background forces being examined by 
this research which breeds the underlying socio-economic issues. 
Oshionebo’s work falls into the group of scholars who analysed the effects (as opposed to the cause) 
by blaming the culture of corporate malfeasance in the Niger Delta on ‘Stabilization clauses’ contained 
in the BITs establishing the corporation’s activities.121 Similarly, Stevens’ work is another one of the 
works analysing the effects rather than the causes. Steven’s work decried the inadequacies of Nigeria’s 
environmental regulatory and legal standards in the oil and gas sector.122  
 
120 See Oyeniyi Abe, supra note 47. 
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These effects-based analyses reflected in Oshionebo and Stevens’s works must then raise key counter-
questions which go to the heart of the task and objective of this research. Some of those are: why are 
Nigerian environmental laws and regulations inadequate (a la Stevens)? Why did the Nigerian 
government accede to contractual arrangement (i.e. the BITs) with full knowledge of the attendant 
consequences to its ability to fully protect the rights and interests of its people? Why does the 
consideration of keeping to the contractual arrangement of the BITs (to wit the stabilization clauses), 
even when they clearly lead to egregious rights violations, outweighs the consideration of protecting 
the said rights of the people? Also, since Ruggie himself acknowledged the crippling effect of 
globalization on the capabilities of governments to discharge their international law obligations to 
protect the human rights of persons within their jurisdiction, 123 has the UN framework and GPs 
remedied that and how?  
Answers to these critical questions shall be gleaned from the respective critical analysis conducted in 
the succeeding chapters of this thesis, on the apt application of the theoretical framework now 
discussed below.  
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1.9 THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
1.9.1 Theories 
The key theoretical framework adopted is the Baxian theory on the emergence of a trade-related, 
market-friendly (TREMF) human rights paradigm.124 Baxi posited that human rights as enunciated by 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and other relevant international125 (and national) 
Human Rights instruments are ‘steadily, but surely being supplanted’ by the TREMF paradigm126. 
Below is a summary of some of the sub-claims emerging from the TREMF theory that are relevant to 
this research: 
1. That the obligations assigned to states under the UDHR paradigm are being supplanted or 
replaced with a more drastically pursued obligations to liberalize market, deregulate, 
denationalize and all such other strategies that enhance free trades by the powerful Global 
North nations both directly and through the instrumentality of institutions such as the World 
Bank or IMF which they substantially control. 
2. That the Global South states to whom these new TREMF paradigm is directed now considers 
the pursuit of such trade liberalization and market efficiency obligations primal, to the 
detriment and at the expense of (individual or community based) human rights. 
3. That in the pursuit, and as a consequence, of this trade-liberalization and market efficiency 
pursuits, human rights as it applies to human individuals or communities are being supplanted 
and diminished for the sake of assigning more rights to global capital. 
4. And that this pursuit of trade liberalization and market efficiency now marks the new standard 
for measuring the progress (or goodness) of (majorly Global South or Third World) states. In 
 
124 See Upendra Baxi, ‘The Future of Human Rights’ (New Delhi 2006) p 234 - 275 
125 For instance, the ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW inter alia 
126 Baxi supra (n124) at 234. 
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other words, that yardsticks such as how much protection (from political instability or social 
unrests) and liberalization (from regulation) these TREMF-subject states accord/offer to 
global capital/corporate entities are now the ultimate standards for determining their 
progress.127 
Fleshing these out and in the order in which they manifest, the first sub-claim postulates that powerful 
first world/Global North nations and the Bretton Woods institutions (which they substantially 
control) set a new overriding obligation or agenda for the weaker (mostly third world/Global South) 
states to liberalize their markets and create free trade mechanisms for global capital. This is achieved 
through trade agreements, economic reform advice, loan, aid and other forms of financial assistance 
programs and so on. By this, a new and more drastic obligation is created for the weaker (mostly third 
world/Global South) states. Mechanisms such as economic sanctions, Foreign Direct Investment 
diversion, investor-state investment dispute mechanisms (arbitration) and other diplomatic strong-
arming measures are ways by which this TREMF paradigm are engendered.  
Secondly, the weaker states then strive to meet the demands and expectations of the set TREMF 
obligation through the pursuit of pro-market efficient and pro-free-trade policies of denationalization, 
deregulation and disinvestment. These represent the new and overriding goal of government. That 
goal is then pursued somewhat inevitably through the reduction or weakening (in some cases) and 
total abandonment (in other cases), of the regulatory, oversight and/or supervisory roles of 
government in the politico-economic activities of the state.  
The knock-on effect is reflected in the consequential weakness of legal and regulatory regimes in the 
economic sectors especially those operated by global capital. This is compounded with levity or laxity 
 
127 Okafor, O, ‘Assessing Baxi’s Thesis on an Emergent Trade-Related Market-Friendly Human 
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in enforcing the weak legal or regulatory regimes as well as sheer apathy to amend them to 
accommodate or take care of newer regulatory needs and challenges. By these praxes, government 
assumes the position of the ‘soft state’ that Okafor talked about while fleshing out this same theory,128 
just as it also abandons its crucial redistributive obligation under the UDHR.129  
The third step is the diminishing of human rights in the interest of global capital. When government 
pursues the pro-TREMF agenda (as laid out above), it ultimately abrogates, howbeit subtly, its 
(protective, regulatory or redistributive) roles under the UDHR paradigm. This opens up the 
commons (air, land, water and so on), which in most cases serve as factors of production to global 
capital, to unbridled exploitations in a way that undermines their utility for and access by the people 
(the socio-economic problems).130Such misuse/mismanagement/mis-exploitation, in the absence of 
government regulation or oversight, paves way for the emergence of social forces of regulation or 
oversight in the forms of agitations, protests, activisms and so on. This is perhaps the clearest 
illustration of the failings of the Nozick’s minimalist state model of social contract, just as it fortifies 
the Justice as Fairness theory of Rawls where redistribution of the inequalities becomes inevitable.  
The inevitability of the redistributive needs breeds the social forces in the absence of the state or the 
state’s apparent softness to global capital. These social forces are by their very nature, in opposition 
to the TREMF agenda/paradigm. They seek to foster continued regulation where the TREMF 
paradigm would rather deregulate; and engender a social-form of stake or investment where the 
TREMF paradigm would rather have a disinvestment.131 The social forces themselves are then viewed 
 
128 Okafor Supra (n 127) p 4  
129 Baxi Supra at 124 
130 Note that this utility of and access to the commons are both matters of human rights as espoused under the UDHR 
paradigm such as a right to safe environment, right to water, right to property etc. 
131 For a detailed analysis of the role of social pressures/forces in regulation see Kagan R, Gunningham N & Thornton D, 
‘Explaining Corporate Environmental Performance: How Does Regulation Matter’ (2003) Law & Society Review, Vol. 37, 
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by government and other Pro-TREMF counterparts (MNCs, TNCs, Bretton Woods Institutions and 
the powerful first world states) as ‘problems’ that needs tackling, instead of the underlying issues that 
gave rise to their emergence such as lack of regulation and the mismanagement of resources among 
other vices. This brings about a clash; whereby the soft state must then protect the agents of global 
capital from the consequences of the redistributive efforts of the social forces. Driving it home, this 
is the construct that creates the ‘internal hardness’ phenomenon which translates into incidents of 
human rights abuses (e.g. reflected in the crackdowns, anti-resistance laws and other measures) 
deployed by the soft states and geared towards (a la Okafor) “de-legitimizing the human rights-based practices 
of resistance of its own citizens”.132 
Lastly, and most important of all, the fourth sub-claim highlights the implementation and enforcement 
mechanisms of the TREMF agenda. The ‘good’ or ‘progressive’ states are now those that show 
commitment to the TEMF agenda, by protecting global capital from the social forces of regulation 
highlighted above. These come by way of commendation or endorsement or condonation of the anti-
human rights actions of the government in pursuance of the TREMF agenda.  The condonations are 
usually by way of silence or turning blind eyes to the human rights atrocities of a government by the 
TREMF initiators (i.e. the Bretton Woods Institutions and powerful Global North nations).  
This TREMF theory is the key lens for the critical analysis of the Niger Delta socio-economic issues. 
It will also form the bedrock for the critique of the practicality of the UN framework and GPs in 
effecting real positive impact on the lived experiences, in terms of socio-economic justice, of victims 
such as the Niger Delta people.  
In addition to TREMF theory, other theoretical frames that were applied include soft law theory in 
international law, Rajagopal’s critical theory on (judicial) interpretation and application of the human 
 
132 Ibid n127 at 4 
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rights texts in a way that suggests ‘a pro right but anti-poor’ praxis,133 Makau Wa Mutua’s metaphorical 
theory on the grand International human rights narrative pitting ‘Savages’ on the one side and ‘Victims 
and Saviours’ on the other.134 Other theories on the UN framework and GPs135 and on corporate 
social responsibility were equally deployed in discharging the task of this research.136 
1.9.2 Methodology 
The methodology of this research work includes the synthesis of readily available data (both electronic 
and hard copies) to highlight the socio-economic issues in the Niger Delta. This study is fundamentally 
critical in nature. Its brand of critique is a hybridisation of De Souza Santos’ ‘reconstructive critique’ 
with the more common approach of synthesizing, adopting or re-echoing previous deconstructive 
analysis done on the subject matter of oil, human rights and the environment in the Niger Delta.137 
The “reconstructive critique” methodology links back to the fundamental objective underpinning this 
research which is to be both tactful in identifying the underlying problems (i.e. the TREMF paradigms) 
and equally innovative in the evolution and recommendation of solutions.    
This ultimately shaped this research to be a multi-disciplinary (or interdisciplinary at least) study, 
requiring the synthesis of a wide breadth of materials from law, to politics, international development, 
health, environment and so on. These materials were both primary and secondary and were sourced 
 
133 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, “Pro-Human Rights but Anti-Poor? A Critical Evaluation of the Indian Supreme Court from 
a Social Movement Perspective” (2007) 8:3 Hum Rights Rev 157, online: 
<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12142-007-0004-8>. This will be applied mainly in critiquing the judicial 
attitude towards the socio-economic plight of the Niger Deltans 
134 Makau W Mutua, 'Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights', SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1525547 
(Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2001). This theory will be deployed for a metaphoric and satiric critique 
of the filibusterous attitude of the OECD, EU and US (in other word, first world nations) to the progress of a binding 
Human Rights Treaty.  
135 See for instance Simons, supra note 37. 
136 E.g. Muchlinski’s Stakeholder theory to Human Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility. See P Muchlinski, 
‘Implementing the New UN Corporate Human Rights Framework: Implications for Corporate Law, Governance and 
Regulation’ 22 Business Ethics Quarterly 145 (2012)  
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from online/electronic and hardcopy/desk collections. The Primary sources are largely legal in nature 
such as the constitution, case laws, national pieces of legislation as well as international and regional 
legal instruments. These primary sources provide concrete and definitive positions of the laws and 
policies in this subject area.  
The secondary sources include textbooks; journal articles; reports from reputable international and 
non-governmental organisations; reports of relevant government ministries, departments, agencies 
and so on. These sources provide the most objective, reliable and consistent illustration for a key part 
of this research’s scrutiny which is the official behaviour/attitude of the Nigerian government (both 
past and present) to the Niger Delta socio-economic problem. They also, aside validating the multi or 
inter-disciplinary nature of this research, reflect the width and breadth of its considerations and 
analysis which must speak to the credibility of the respective arguments and findings of this research. 
As they are more subjective in nature; representing mostly individual (as in journal articles) or 
organisational (such as World bank reports etc) positions, this research cautiously sourced and utilized 
only those secondary materials that can withstand the most rigorous tests of credibility.  
This decision to use readily available data/materials for this research is mainly informed by the 
availability and accessibility of such relevant materials relating to the Niger Delta socio-economic 
issues online. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Whose Hand is that: Examining the role of the TREMF Paradigm in the Socio 
Economic Injustice in the Niger Delta  
2.1 Abstract 
This chapter provides a brief background of the socio-economic problems in the Niger Delta and 
assesses how they exemplify or trouble Upendra Baxi’s germinal theory on the emergence of a trade-
related and market-friendly (TREMF) human rights paradigm.138  This chapter does not, however, 
delve all that much into an expository or evaluative analysis of the Niger Delta’s socio-economic 
(environmental or human rights) issues. In line with the aim and objectives of this thesis, it is rather 
concerned with applying the TREMF theory to the outlined and very well-known issues facing that 
area of Nigeria, with a view to exemplifying or rebutting the TREMF theory, as represented by its 
earlier summarized sub-claims. 
2.2 The Impacts of Oil Exploration in the Niger Delta 
Studies and empirical evidence have shown that crude oil exploitation impacts the people and 
communities of the Niger Delta region in two major adverse ways: environmental degradation and 
human rights violations.139 These impacts have been thoroughly studied and laid out in many academic 
and policy papers published over the years by both individuals140and governmental/non-governmental 
 
138 Upendra Baxi, ‘The Future of Human Rights’ (New Delhi 2006) p 234 - 275 
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institutions cum organizations.141 To that end, the discussion in this section on the impacts of crude 
oil exploration, is only a modest analysis to lay the foundation for their utilization in testing the Baxian 
TREMF theory.142 
2.2.1 The Environmental Impacts 
The National Petroleum Policy document approved and released by the Federal Government of 
Nigeria in mid-2017 identified six major adverse environmental impacts associated with crude oil 
exploration in the Niger Delta as: 143  
1. Oil Spills 
2. Gas Flaring and Venting 
3. Discharge of chemical waste derived from crude oil related processes 
4. Contamination of water bodies 
5. Soil and land contamination 
6. Depletion of biodiversity and destruction of farmlands144  
These (non-exhaustive) environmental impacts have continued to catalyze a chain reaction and vicious 
circle of other more drastic pitfalls for the people and communities of the Niger Delta region. They 
have had a direct adverse impact on the sustenance and livelihood of the Niger Delta people. The 
Niger Delta is an archetypical Nigerian society/community which depends largely on their 
environment (Soil, forest and water bodies) for their sustenance and livelihood. One Report has 
 
Int’l Bus & Trade L 1; 4. Oyeniyi Abe, “The Feasibility of Implementing the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights in the Extractive Industry in Nigeria” (2016) 7 J Sustainable Dev L & Pol’y 137. 
141 such as Nigeria’s federal government’s National Petroleum Policy document available here 
<http://www.petroleumindustrybill.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/National-Petroleum-Policy-Approved-by-
FEC-in-July-2017.pdf> and the World Banks’ (WB), Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) and Amnesty International’s (AI) 
numerous study publications on this subject matter 
142 Baxi supra n 138 
143 National Petroleum Policy  (supra) Available at < http://www.petroleumindustrybill.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/National-Petroleum-Policy-Approved-by-FEC-in-July-2017.pdf> Accessed 20th January 2018 
144 National Petroleum Policy (Supra) at 43 
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documented that over 60% of the entire Niger Delta families are sustained either through farming or 
fishing or a combination of both. 145 
It can then be deduced that these adverse impacts of crude oil exploitation undermine the survival 
and livelihood of the host communities. It exacerbates the prevailing effects of poverty and deepens 
the inequality of the Niger Delta inhabitants in comparison to other Nigerians. The corollary is simply 
that, in the light of these gruelling difficulties, sustenance is made significantly (if not substantially) 
more difficult for inhabitants of the Niger Delta. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that Nigeria 
has very few effective social security support or assistance programs. 
These negative impacts on the Niger Delta’s environment have also had the reasonably foreseeable 
and harmful consequences on the healthcare of the inhabitants. A 2017 research report issued by 
researchers at the University of St. Gallen has found a link between oil spillages and infant mortality 
in the Niger Delta.146 According to their findings, new born babies are more likely to die in the first 
month of their life if their mothers lived near an oil spill site before conception.147 
Audrey Gaughran, former Director of Global Issues and Research at Amnesty International, put the 
causational chain of this issue into perspective when she explained that: 
“[P]eople living in the Niger Delta have to drink, cook with and wash in polluted water. They eat fish contaminated 
with oil and other toxins . . . After oil spills the air they breathe smells of oil, gas and other pollutants. People complain 
of breathing problems and skin lesions . . .”148 
 
145 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Niger Delta Human Development Report, 2006, p74. 
146 See research of report here <https://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6653.pdf>  also reported in the 
Guardian Newspaper UK of 6th November 2017 and available here https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2017/nov/06/Niger Delta-oil-spills-linked-infant-deaths both accessed 20th April 2018 
147 Ibid n146 
148 Amnesty International, ‘Nigeria: Pollution has created Human Rights Tragedy in the Niger Delta’ (Abuja, June 2009) 
available here <https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2009/06/nigeria-amnesty-international-says-pollution-has-
created-human-rights-tr/> Accessed 18th February 2018 
40 
 
Another study also showed that water-related diseases in Nigeria are most endemic and acute in the 
Niger Delta as compared to other areas of the country.149 Water-related diseases are said to account 
for over 80% of all reported diseases in the Niger Delta region.150 It is apparent from these illustrations 
that these environmental impacts resulting from crude oil exploitation also undermine the health of 
the Niger Delta inhabitants significantly.  
With health challenges come some attendant economic and social costs (such as costs of treating 
illnesses, the lack of physical fitness to work, and inability to provide for self or family, and so on). In 
Nigeria, and mostly in the rural areas which the Niger Delta region largely qualifies as, the cost of 
medical treatment is commonly and largely borne by individual patients. Such costs add more 
economic burden on the affected persons, just as the indirect consequences of adverse environmental 
impacts on their overall means of sustenance are exacerbated.  
There are also other long-term and less obvious consequences of these environmental impacts. Firstly, 
gas flaring is believed to be a notable cause of the large-scale destruction of the mangrove swamps 
and the rainforest ecological zones found in the Niger Delta.151 Secondly, the long-term consequence 
of these degradations, especially at its current unabated and unbridled state, can spread far beyond the 
Niger Delta region to other communities.152 Indeed, global warming, which can result from gas flaring, 
would leave no community both near and far from the Niger Delta untouched. The expansion of 
these problems, with their attendant consequences to a much larger national and even global 
population may prove as difficult to contain as the problems in the Niger Delta themselves.  
 
149 Sabella O. Abidde, ‘Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Militancy, Amnesty and the Postamnesty Environment (Lexington London, 2017) pp 
38 – 40, quoting the NDDC’s 2006 Niger Delta Regional Development Plan Report at page 91 
150 Ibid n149 
151 See Generally Anthony Oso Bisong, The Effects of Natural Gas Flaring on Climate Change in Nigeria (Society of Petroleum 
Engineers, 2014); “Gas Flaring and Global Warming”, online: <http://www.global-greenhouse-warming.com/gas-
flaring-and-global-warming.html>; Stephen C Nwanya, “Climate change and energy implications of gas flaring for 
Nigeria” (2011) 6:3 Int J Low-Carbon Tech 193, online: <https://academic.oup.com/ijlct/article/6/3/193/680774>. 
152 Sabella O. Abidde, (Supra) p 42 
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Thirdly, these adverse environmental impacts create a chain reaction; where the economic and social 
pitfalls they bring about in turn instigate vices that in themselves further undermine livelihoods, peace, 
security and overall wellbeing in the region and beyond.153 Those vices (such as oil-theft, oil pipeline 
and other facilities vandalism etc) then pave the way, justifiably or not, for the usual high-handed 
interventions by the state (i.e. Nigeria’s federal security agents); which then lead to a whole different 
set of dire socio-economic vicious circle such as extra-judicial killings, treatments akin to torture and 
inhuman/degrading treatments of the Niger Delta people.  
2.2.2 The Human Rights Violations 
For clarity, as it is used here, the expression ‘human rights’ refers to the legal rights, entitlements and 
values guaranteed in the various international,154 regional/continental155 and national156 human rights 
instruments. For this same purpose, primacy is accorded to the international, then the 
regional/continental and then, the national legal regimes, in that hierarchal order. 
These instruments include the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (The African Charter), 
which was adopted in 1981 by the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now known as the 
African Union (AU), and which came into force in 1986.157 In compliance with its dualist legal system, 
Nigeria ratified and re-enacted the African Charter into its domestic body of laws.158 It was the first 
international human rights instrument to recognize a safe and healthy environment as a human right.159 
 
153 Speaking of vices such as such as oil-theft, oil pipeline and other facilities vandalism as well as violent and non-violent 
agitations in the Niger Delta 
154 Such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) 1966, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 1966 and so on.  
155 Such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (The African Charter) 1981 
156 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (As amended), The African Charter Act and other body of 
national laws and legislation 
157 Now African Union (AU) 
158 As the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights Act (Ratification and Enforcement0 Act, Cap A9, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria 2004 by virtue of section 12(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (As 
Amended) 
159 Article 24 of the Charter provides for a right to ‘a general satisfactory environment favourable to . . . development’  
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The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) also contains an 
obligation on state-parties to take steps that will ensure the achievement “of all aspects of 
environmental and industrial hygiene” for their citizens.160  
The preceding section highlighted the adverse environmental impacts of oil exploration in the Niger 
Delta, which includes the recently discovered link between oil spillages and infant mortality.161 It also 
pointed to the prevalence of water-borne diseases in the region, as well as the problems of waste 
contamination (of air, water and lands) and gas flaring. These are all evidence, however modest, that 
the environment in the Niger Delta is neither “satisfactory” (according to the duty imposed by Article 
24 of the African Charter) nor “hygienic” (as required by Article 12 (2) (b) of the ICESCR).  
Thus, the state of the Niger Delta’s environment, undermines the economic, physical and social 
development of the Niger Delta peoples as guaranteed under the Charter.162 For sure, the adverse 
environmental impacts highlighted above violate the human right to ‘a general satisfactory 
environment favourable to [the] development’ of the people of Niger Delta.163  
Furthermore, a report by Amnesty International has distilled the other main heads of human rights 
that are violated as a result of crude oil production (or activities incidental or ancillary to it) in the 
Niger Delta.164They are: 165 
 
160 See Article 12 (2) b 
161 See the research at n146 
162 Article 24 (Supra)  
163 This is also a right provided in Article 12 of the ICESCR (supra)  
164 Amnesty International, ‘Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta’ (Abuja 2009), available online 
here <https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/afr440172009en.pdf> and accessed 4th April 2018 
165 Ibid n164 at 10 
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“Violations of the right to an adequate standard of living, including the right to food – as a consequence of the impact 
of oil-related pollution and environmental damage on agriculture and fisheries, which are the main sources of food for 
many people in the Niger Delta.166   
Violations of the right to gain a living through work – also as a consequence of widespread damage to agriculture and 
fisheries, because these are also the main sources of livelihood for many people in the Niger Delta.167  
Violations of the right to water – which occur when oil spills and waste materials pollute water used for drinking and 
other domestic purposes.168  
Violations of the right to health – which arise from failure to secure the underlying determinants of health, including a 
healthy environment, and failure to enforce laws to protect the environment and prevent pollution.169   
The absence of any adequate monitoring of the human impacts of oil-related pollution – despite the fact that the oil 
industry in the Niger Delta is operating in a relatively densely populated area characterized by high levels of poverty and 
vulnerability.170  
Failure to provide affected communities with adequate information or ensure consultation on the impacts of oil operations 
on their human rights.171  
Failure to ensure access to effective remedy for people whose human rights have been violated.”172 
 
166 Enshrined in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 11 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
167 See Article 23.1 of the UDHR, Article 15 of the African Charter, Article 6 (Part III) of the ICESCR 
168 Article 14.2 (h) of the Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Article 
24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Article 28 (2) of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD). This right was also impliedly upheld/acknowledged by the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) in its decision in the Biwater Gauff Ltd. v Government of Tanzania dispute, where although it 
found in favour of Biwater, it however did not award any monetary damages to it due to the paramountcy of public interest 
in a safe drinking water.  
169 Implicit in Article 25 of the UDHR. See also Article 12 of the ICESCR and Article 18(1) of the African Charter. 
170 See Article 24 of the African Charter (Supra) and Article 12 of the ICESCR 
171 See Article 9 of the African Charter 
172 Article 8 of UDHR (Supra), Article 7 of the Charter (Supra),  
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In addition to these set out violations, there are pockets of other human rights infringements 
occasioned by crude oil exploitation in the Niger Delta area. For instance, Article 21 of the African 
Charter provides for a right of a people “to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources”. It goes ahead 
to indicate that “[T]his right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people” and that “[I]n no case shall a 
people be deprived of it”. Although it impliedly places this obligation in the hand of the ‘state’ to exercise 
on behalf of the people (as it seems by sub 4 of the Article), it does however charge the state to 
“eliminate all forms of foreign economic exploitation . . . so as to enable their peoples to fully benefit from the advantage 
derived from their national resources”.173  
 This Article 21 right is violated frequently and flagrantly in the Niger Delta situation. For example, 
the African Commission on Human Peoples Rights (The African Commission) in the case; Social and 
Economic Rights Action/Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria (the Ogoni Case) 174 held that the 
Nigerian government flagrantly and massively breached these rights of the Ogoni people in the 
manner with which it runs the crude oil business and appropriates its earnings.175  
There is also the violation of the right to property ownership of the Niger Delta people and 
communities.176 This is enabled by a piece of national legislation known as the Land Use Act (LUA).177 
According to the Supreme Court of Nigeria (SCON) in Abioye v Yakubu, 178 the Act did the following 
to individual and customary land ownership in Nigeria: 
 
173 Article 21 (5) of the Charter (Supra) 
174 (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001) 
175 For a detailed report and analysis of the case’s outcome; see Dinah Shelton, “Decision Regarding Communication 
155/96 (Social and Economic Rights Action/Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria)”, 96 A.J.I.L., 2002, p. 937 
at para 58 
176 Provided for in Article 17 of the UDHR (Supra) and Article 14 of the African Charter (and implied in Article 21 of the 
same charter) and section 43 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) 
177 Land Use Act 1978 Cap 202, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 
178 (1991) 5 NWLR (pt 190) 130  
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1. It removed the radical title in land from individual Nigerians, families and communities and 
vested the same in the Governor of each states of the Nigerian federation. 
2. It removed the control and management of lands from family/community heads and vests 
them in the same Governor of each state.179 
Therefore, ownership of lands by the Niger Delta people (as in the case of every other Nigerian 
anyways) is ultimately not permanent and is subject to the desires and decisions of the state 
Governor/government. By section 28 of the Act, the Governor may at any time expropriate personal 
or communal lands ‘in the overriding public interest’. Such interests were further explained to include “the 
requirement of the land for mining purposes or oil pipelines or for any purpose connected therewith”180. Ako puts this 
in perspective by opining that:181 
“. . . the inhabitants of the [Niger Delta] region may be dispossessed of their land whenever their land is required for oil 
production, making them tenants-at-will of the oil industry on land they have owned and inhabited for centuries”.182 
This is essentially what the people of Niger Delta have faced for decades since the discovery of crude 
oil in their environs. The effect of the said section 28 (supra) is that it has radically removed both the 
right and the means by which the Niger Delta people may ‘freely dispose of their wealth/resources’ and vested 
it in the Governor or government of the state. What is more, the LUA enjoys constitutional status, 
thereby making it impossible to be amended or repealed without going through the full and difficult 
procedure of constitutional amendment under Nigerian law.183 
 
179 Per Andrew Obaseki JSC (OBM) at 223, paras (d) – (g) 
180 See Land Use Act 1978, s28 
181 Rhuks Ako, ‘Nigeria’s Land Use Act: An Anti-thesis to Environmental Justice’ (2009) JAL (2) 
182 Ibid n182 at 296.  
183 The Constitutional Amendment Procedure is laid down in section 9(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1999 (As Amended) 
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Even from a cursory look at these laid-out rights violations, it becomes apparent how the exploitation 
of crude oil militates against the socio-economic wellbeing of the Niger Delta people. The existence 
of crude oil in the area makes them twice as likely (or maybe more) to be victims of land and resource 
expropriation than other Nigerians. The result of these expropriations is that the Niger Delta people 
are forced to survive on scarcer resources (land, water, forest, biodiversity and so on) than other 
Nigerian communities with no mineral deposits in their environs. The Pollution of their environment 
exacerbates the socio-economic injustices that they experienced, in that it further limits both the 
quantity184 and quality185 of the resources available to them for sustenance or survival. 
In the light of all these, and as was laid out in the aims and objectives of this thesis, it becomes 
imperative to launch a critical inquiry into why all these violations have existed and persisted unbridled 
for so many years.  
2.3 TREMF Theory and the Socio-Economic Problems in the Niger Delta Area of Nigeria 
This section interrogates what roles (if any) the emergence of the ‘trade-related, market-friendly’ 
(TREMF) paradigm of human rights has played in the development of the socio-economic problems 
highlighted above. Recall that Baxi had argued that human rights under the paradigm of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is ‘steadily, but surely being supplanted’ by the TREMF paradigm.186 
From that theory emerged four (4) sub-claims summarised in chapter one.  
Those sub-claims will be deployed to analyse the socio-economic problems described above, to 
determine the extent to which the TREMF theory is exemplified and/or troubled by the already 
discussed human and environmental rights situations in the Niger Delta. 187 
 
184 e.g. amount of unpolluted lands water, fishes available to the people for use 
185 e.g. the fertility of land, safety of the water and hygiene or healthiness of the seafoods 
186 Upendra Baxi, ‘The Future of Human Rights’ (New Delhi 2006) p 234 - 275 
187 Baxi supra (n186) at 234. 
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2.3.1 Sub-claim One: The Bretton Woods Institutions and Global North States as Authors 
of the TREMF Agenda/Paradigm  
The underlying basis of this sub-claim is that powerful (mostly Global North) nations and (or through) 
the Bretton Woods Institutions have tended to create a supervening trade-liberalization agenda for 
the weaker and mostly Global South nations.188 This agenda is usually created through the 
instrumentality of trade agreements/treaties, economic stimulus packages, economic reform or 
restructuring advice, financial relief or financial assistance agreements and their attendant 
conditionalities, etc. The power imbalances that exist between North and South countries and peoples 
quickly transform this agenda into an obligation or responsibility (on the part of the South), policed 
by certain international institutions and the Global North through the mechanisms of stabilization 
clauses189, economic, trade or political sanctions, investor-state arbitration processes and its 
enforcement mechanisms and so on. With all those sources of pressures and the gruelling consequence 
of defiance, the so-called weaker states tend to aim to meet the obligation/responsibility through the 
pursuit of market efficiency via the three interrelated mechanisms of Deregulation, Denationalisation 
and Disinvestment (the 3Ds).  
Within this framework, it is seen as fundamental to the successful implementation of these 3Ds 
mechanism that more freedom, more rights and more protections are assigned to the agents of global 
capital (i.e. the Multinational Corporations a.k.a MNCs and Transnational Corporations a.k.a TNCs) 
with little or no corresponding duties/responsibilities. This fundamental feature of the 3Ds 
problematizes the prospects of advancing or protecting human rights (for individuals or communities) 
in the sense envisaged under the UDHR paradigm. This is because under the UDHR, the state (a la 
Baxi) ‘is assigned human responsibilities . . . to construct . . . a just social order . . . that will at least meet the basic 
 
188 Baxi supra 
189 For a detailed Analysis of the effect of Stabilization clauses in this respect, see generally Oshionebo, supra note 13. 
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needs of human beings’; like water, food, healthy environment, work etc.190 To adequately discharge that 
responsibility, the state ought to play a central regulatory, control and re-distributive role akin to the 
Rawlsian postulations under his second principle of justice.191 Whereas under the TREMF paradigm, 
the state is to free up markets and adopt a minimalist and ‘night watchman’ role as espoused under 
Nozick’s theory.192 Therefore the role envisaged for the state under the UDHR paradigm is much 
more robust but runs counter to that it is assigned under the emergent TREMF paradigm.  
In Nigeria, economic reform was the channel through which the TREMF paradigm was implemented 
and operationalized. Its strong onset can be traced to the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), 
brokered by Britain and the US, authored by the Bretton Wood Institutions (i.e. the IMF and World 
Bank) and then introduced into Nigeria in 1986 by the military government of General Ibrahim 
Babangida.193 Sharp increases in oil revenue in the early 70s motivated Nigeria to venture into a public 
investment program in infrastructure and social services. This drove government spending to a very 
high level, relying almost exclusively on revenue accruing from the oil and gas sector without any 
corresponding effort to equally develop and grow revenue from the non-oil sectors.  It was no surprise 
that the crash of the global oil prices in the early 80s put a drastic strain on the economic and social 
wellbeing of the nation and its people. 
The Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) that the then Babangida regime adopted was touted to be 
the panacea to the economic woes confronting the nation-state at the time. The blanket summary of 
the SAP’s stated objective “was to help promote economic efficiency and private sector development as a basis for 
 
190 Baxi Supra 
191 Rawls J, ‘A Theory of Justice’ Rev edn (Harvard University Press, 1999) pp 10-18  
192 See Norzick R, ‘Anarchy, State and Utopia’ (Oxford, 1974) at 30 
193 For Analysis of the SAP, see generally Ihonvbere, J O (1993) ‘Economic Crisis, Structural Adjustment and 
Social Crisis in Nigeria’ World Development 21, pp 141- 158, at p 143 (hereafter “Economic Crisis”); and Mosley, P (1992) 
‘Policy-Making without Facts: A Note on the Assessment of Structural Adjustment Policies in Nigeria, 1985-1990” African 
Affairs 91,pp 227-240 at pp 228-230 
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improving prospects for long-term growth”.194 As said, Britain played a key role in propagating and advancing 
the SAP. Former British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, 195 made this clear in Lagos, during her 
visit to Nigeria in 1988. Speaking of Gen. Babangida, she said: 196  
“I have great admiration for the leadership he is giving here and for the courageous way in which he is tackling the 
economic problems of the country and for the (SAP) agreement which he has just reached with the IMF, and we are very 
pleased that we in the United Kingdom have been able to help”197 
Reduction of debts/borrowing and balance of payment deficits, as well as achieving a robust fiscal 
responsibility for the nation, no doubt became very necessary at the time. These goals can only be 
achieved through a corresponding increase in revenue generation, the bulk of which is dependent on 
the petroleum sector. A target was set to increase oil production capacity to 2.5mb/d and raise reserves 
to 20 billion barrels by mid 1990s (this deadline was later readjusted to 1998).198 The key role the sector 
plays in the economic direction and stability of the country made it the primary sector for the 
implementation of the pro-market liberalization and pro-TREMF policies of the SAP. 
Since the success of the SAP policies is hinged on the creation of a corresponding market-friendly 
environment, the corollary is that the Nigerian government introduced free trade policies of 
disinvestment and deregulation in its petroleum sector. This was aimed at encouraging the foreign 
MNCs in the sector to expand their investments.199 Under the disinvestment policy, the Nigerian 
 
194 The World Bank, ‘Nigeria Structural Adjustment Program: Policies, Implementation and Impact (May, 1994) at vii 
available here <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/959091468775569769/pdf/multi0page.pdf> accessed 10th 
May 2018 
195 Who herself was a fierce advocate of the TREMF/neoliberal policies of deregulation, disinvestment and 
denationalization and well known for her own ruthless battle and subsequent dismantling of the trade unions in the UK 
196 See Transcript of Mrs. Thatcher’s Speech here <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107608> Accessed 10th 
May 2018. 
197 Emphasis mine 
198 Ibid n194 at 53 
199 One can see all the fingerprints of the Thatcher pro-TREMF and anti-organized opposition policies on this program 
as the Nigerian government vehemently clamped down on trade unions and other forms of collective/organized 
opposition groups. 
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National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)200began to shed (and sell) their equity ownership in the oil 
exploration joint ventures it had with the oil MNCs from a 60% to a 55% holding. 201  
In order to deregulate, new MOUs were signed between the NNPC and the oil MNCs in July 1991 
with incentives such as granting the MNCs bonuses for net additions to proven reserves, increasing 
their guaranteed profit margin from $2.0 USD to $2.5USD per barrel and revising the formulae for 
determining the price at which the government allows them (the MNCs) to sell their crude.202 Another 
additional incentive saw the relaxation of the already fragile regulatory frameworks and enforcement 
mechanisms in the oil and gas sector by the government. This caused oil spills and other adverse 
impacts of exploration to shoot through the roof, with no remediation, cleaning nor consequences (in 
terms of legal enforcement) for the spilling corporations.203 
The imposition of the TREMF agenda and obligations carried on to successive administrations under 
different forms, guises and aliases (e.g. Economic Reform Plan, Economic Reform Agenda, 
Transformation Agenda and so on). Under the civilian administration of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, it 
was broadly known as the Economic Reform Plan (ERP) and designated the National Economic 
Empowerment and Development Strategy – NEEDS during the administration’s second tenure.204 
Upon resumption of its second term in office, the administration shaped up for the implementation 
of these pro-TREMF policies perhaps, by picking a Nigerian renowned World Bank top executive, in 
the person of Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, as its Finance Minister and Professor Chukwuma Soludo, a 
World Bank affiliate and consultant, as the Governor of Nigeria’s Central Bank. These institutions, 
 
200 This is the government agency/corporation exercising government’s control of the oil and gas sector 
201 The World Bank, ‘Nigeria Structural Adjustment Program: Policies, Implementation and Impact (May, 1994) at 55 
202 Ibid n 201 at 53 
203 Sabella O. Abidde, (Supra) at page 41 -42 
204 For the IMF’s and WB’s inspiration and support of the Economic Reform Program, see IMF (2005) ‘Semi-Annual 
Staff Report under Intensified Surveillance: Nigeria’ IMF Country Report No. 05/37, 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr0537.pdf> 28November 2007 p 1 accessed 4th February 2018 
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the Finance ministry and the Central Bank, are the two most critical determinants and formulators of 
Nigeria’s economic policies and strategies.  
Buoyed by these personnel and supports, the administration began the implementation of the 
recommended pro-TREMF policies under its NEEDS/Economic Reform Plan (ERP) in two strategic 
ways.205 Firstly, it began with its aggressive privatization and disinvestment programs, packaged as one 
of the key pillars of the NEEDS program. This received the unflinching support of the powerful 
Global North nations through the Bretton Woods institutions they control.206 The World Bank 
admitted this much when it declared in its Nigerian Country Assistance Evaluation report (1998 – 
2007) that: 
“[A]nother element of Bank’s involvement in the private sector was providing for the [Nigerian] government’s 
privatization program under which most commercial state-owned enterprises were privatized”.207  
Despite the wave of unrest, untold hardships and consequential human rights violations following 
from the government’s crackdown on labour and civil society protesters against the disinvestment and 
privatization programs,208 the IMF still adjudged those an “excellent progress”.209 
 
205 See Okafor, O, ‘Assessing Baxi’s Thesis on an Emergent Trade-Related Market-Friendly Human: Rights Paradigm: 
Evidence from Nigerian Labour-led Struggles,’, 2007 (1) Law, Social Justice & Global Development Journal (LGD) 
 at page 5; available online at <http://www.go.warwick.ac.uk/elj/lgd/2007_1/okafor> Accessed 10th October 2017  
206 See World Bank’s "policy document in support of the Obasanjo’s administration ERP, titled, ‘ Nigeria Privatization 
Support Project’ available online here 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/427751468759334875/pdf/multi0page.pdf> Accessed 23rd of April 
2018 
207 The World Bank, ‘Nigeria Country Assistance Evaluation 1998 -2007’ available in pdf online at 
<https://www.oecd.org/countries/nigeria/47886664.pdf> at 14, accessed January 31st 2019 
208 For details of the labour and civil society protests that greeted the privatization programs, See Okafor, O, ibid at 68 
209 The IMF, ‘Nigeria: First Review Under the Policy Support Instrument—Staff Report; Staff Statement; Press Release 
on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Nigeria” available online in pdf at 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06180.pdf> p 8 
52 
 
Secondly, it also embarked on the deregulation of the oil downstream sector; a new responsibility 
which inevitably gave rise to the further abandonment of the paradigm of human rights espoused in 
the UDHR and the International Bill of Rights.210  
This praxis of deregulation and privatization (i.e. denationalization and disinvestment) as well as 
market efficiency and trade liberalization have become the hallmark of the economic policies of 
successive Nigerian governments, including the present one. Excerpts from the recently published 
National Petroleum and Gas Policy documents, issued by the current Buhari administration 
underscore this point.211 While the Petroleum Policy’s mission statement was to ‘maximize the production 
and processing of hydrocarbons’, that of the Gas policy was to make Nigeria ‘. . . an attractive gas-based industrial 
nation . . .’212  
A combined reading of the two underlined key words speak to the objective of pursuing pro-TREMF 
agenda in the Nigerian oil and gas sector. The mission to ‘maximise’ production would be backed by 
the creation of a corresponding ‘favourable environment’ that would stimulate that outcome. As the 
analysis in the next section would reveal, this ‘favourable environment’ is usually created by the state 
relaxing (or abandoning) its regulatory obligations while also providing firm protection against any 
‘obstructions’ to the free operations of the oil MNCs.213 In this specific Niger Delta context, such 
protections are typically carried out by way of crackdowns on agitation against the incidence of 
pollution and human rights violations in the oil exploration process in that region; a typical example 
 
210 See World Bank’s policy document in support of the Obasanjo’s administration NEEDS program, titled, ‘ Nigeria 
Privatization Support Project’ available online here 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/427751468759334875/pdf/multi0page.pdf> Accessed 23rd of April 
2018 
211 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Ministry of Petroleum Resources, ‘National Petroleum Policy’ (Abuja, 2017) at 41 Available 
at < http://www.petroleumindustrybill.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/National-Petroleum-Policy-Approved-by-
FEC-in-July-2017.pdf> Accessed 20th January 2018 
212 Supra n 193 at p16 and p14 respectively. Emphasis was supplied by me. 
213 This is when the state is said to have acquired the “soft states” status or syndrome, as expounder fuller in the next 
section 
53 
 
being the execution of the late Ogoni leader, Ken Saro-Wiwa (hereafter ‘the Wiwa execution’), and 
other instances discussed in the later part of this chapter.214  
On the other hand, the prospect of making the nation’s gas industry ‘attractive’ alludes also to 
entrenching the free-trade and free-market policies or agenda. This is also typically pursued by 
implementing pro-TREMF praxis of market liberalization (i.e. relaxed regulations, minimized control 
or interference by government, and the suppression of any anti-exploration agitation of the host 
communities).   
The illustrations above point to the partial imposition of the obligation to implement TREMF on one 
Global South State. The subsequent sections of this chapter will attempt to shed further light on the 
specific ways in which the TREMF theory is exemplified in the Nigerian (Niger Delta) context. 
2.3.2 Sub-claim Two: The Pursuit of Market Efficiency and the Acquisition of the ‘Soft 
States’ Status/Syndrome  
The key argument of this TREMF sub-claim is that states, on taking on the onus of implementing the 
TREMF paradigm, pursue free-trade and adopt market-efficient policies to the benefit of global capital 
while at the same time, resiling to a great extent from their human rights obligations under the UDHR.  
This is what earns them the ‘soft states’ status a la Okafor and triggers what I would term the ‘soft 
states’ syndrome.215 The syndrome refers to the praxis of adopting policies that assign more collective 
rights to, and becoming softer towards, global capital (MNCs and TNCs). In the same vein, they 
ignore or neglect their regulatory and re-distributive roles for the enhancement and advancement of 
human rights of its citizens under the paradigm of the UDHR. The postulation of this sub-claim is 
 
214 This is the phenomenon described further in this thesis as the “internal hardness syndrome”. 
215 See generally Obiora Okafor’s essay, fleshing out the TREMF theory in: Okafor, O, ‘Assessing Baxi’s Thesis on an 
Emergent Trade-Related Market-Friendly Human Rights Paradigm: Evidence from Nigerian Labour-led Struggles,’, 2007 
(1) Law, Social Justice & Global Development Journal (LGD) at 4 
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closely interlinked with that of the third sub-claim, in that the supplanting and diminishing of human 
rights of the people are a direct consequence of the ‘soft state’ status or syndrome of government.   
The postulation above holds true in the Niger Delta situation where government’s actions, are often 
tailored largely towards protecting the interests of the oil MNCs as opposed to those of the Niger 
Delta peoples and communities. There are countless measures targeted towards enhancing and 
promoting the interests and operations of the oil MNCs. For instance (from the perspective of an 
Executive action in this regard), the Amnesty Program (AP) initiative of the Nigerian Federal 
Government is credited with being hugely instrumental to achieving the relatively peaceful atmosphere 
that currently exists in the Niger Delta region. However, critics have argued that it was offered with 
an overriding objective of facilitating optimal production of crude for the oil MNCs by quelling the 
armed conflict which stands as the biggest obstacle to that objective.216  
The AP which is modelled after the prevailing peace-building models generally used by the United 
Nations was hinged on the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) initiative. 
However, as Davidheiser & Nyiayaana rightly pointed out, any DDR program “is expected to comprise 
only the preliminary phases of a much broader process of addressing root causes that initially motivated the 
combatants”.217 For lacking the intent nor framework addressing the root causes of the armed agitation, 
Omadjohwoefe wrote off the AP as having little or nothing to do with providing ‘sustainable solution to 
the unabated damage done to the Niger Delta Environment’ by the exploration activities.218  
The counter or a pro-Nigerian government position to this argument will be that it created a special 
government ministry for the Niger Delta alongside its offer of Amnesty (i.e. the federal Ministry of 
 
216 For an extensive critical analysis of the Amnesty Program, see Mark Davidheiser & Kialee Nyiayaana, ‘Demobilization 
or Remobilization? The Amnesty Program and the Search for Peace in the Niger Delta’ (2010) African Security Journal 
217 Ibid n216 at 44 
218 Ogege Samuel Omadjohwoefe, “Amnesty Initiative and the Dilemma of Sustainable Development in the Niger Delta 
Region of Nigeria” (2011) 4:4 Journal of Sustainable Development 249, online: 
<http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jsd/article/view/10634>. 
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Niger Delta Affairs). The ministry’s role in the words of the late Nigerian President and the initiator 
of the AP, is to “coordinate . . . efforts to tackle the challenges of infrastructural development, 
environment protection and youth empowerment in the [Niger Delta] region”.219 However, the 
ineffectiveness  of the ministry in making any real or meaningful impact in addressing the very well-
known underlying problems causing these agitation (environmental and human rights problems) is  
the Achilles heel of any such counter-argument or narrative. The ministry was created in 2008, but the 
first attempt at cleaning the hazardous oil spillages in the Niger Delta only began in 2017, almost a 
decade after its creation. Even still, the cleaning process (discussed earlier in chapter one) is moving 
at a rate that seriously questions and undermines the government and its MNC counterpart’s real 
intent in seeing the cleaning through.  
Another action that may be presented as a counter to the narrative of government’s lack of intent to 
address the root causes of the Niger Delta agitation may be some legislative efforts at regulating the 
activities of the oil MNCs with pieces of legislations such as the National Environmental Standards 
Regulation Enforcement Agency (NESREA) Act and the National Oil Spill Detection and Response 
Agency (NOSDRA) Act. 220 The NESREA Act was enacted in 2007 (at a time the Niger Delta issues 
were very much on the forefront of national and international concerns), however, it was stripped of 
the power to enforce the environmental legislation or to investigate and prosecute environmental 
infringements by the oil MNCs and in the oil and gas sector in general.221 Similarly, the National Oil 
Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) Act which came into force in 2006, embodies the 
same flaw in that this 28-section-long legislation, contains no provision empowering the agency to 
undertake enforcement actions against those responsible for oil spillages.  
 
219 This Day Newspaper, ‘Why We Created Niger Delta Ministry by Yar’Adua (Lagos, 12th September 2008) available 
online here <https://allafrica.com/stories/200809120002.html> Accessed 15th December 2018 
220 The NESREA Act was enacted to repeal the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) Act and to take over 
its mandate 
221 See sections 7, 8, 24, 29 and 30 of the NESREA Act prohibited the agency’s operations and activities from extending 
into the oil and gas sector 
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Although the agency has a mandate to collect a fine of up to a million naira for ‘failure to clean up the 
impacted [oil spillage] site, to all practical extent including remediation’, the legislation gives it no power of 
enforcing this payment 222. This raises salient questions such as: how must it then deal with cases of 
non-compliance and/or wilful negligence to pay or “clean up impacted oil sites”? Perhaps, this 
incapacity on the part of the agency is why there is no recorded instance that the agency has ever 
applied the relevant section 6 (3) provision of the law to the numerous cases of uncleaned and 
‘unremediated’ oil spillages that has occurred in the Niger Delta, at least, since the enactment of the 
legislation and consequent creation of the agency in 2006.  To drive this point home; the Bodo 
Community oil spill is one of such examples which happened twice; in 2008 and in 2009.223The spills 
were serious enough to draw the ire of international observers224 and substantial enough to ground a 
law suit in the UK (for which Shell later settled out of court with the community).225  
These loopholes in both the NESREA and NOSDRA acts leave regulation and enforcement powers 
in the petroleum sector under the purview of the NNPC. Bear in mind that the NNPC is the Nigerian 
state-owned oil company that represents the state’s ultimate interest in the sector which the forgoing 
analysis have shown to be largely, the optimization of crude oil production and the eventual attainment 
of market efficiency in the sector. Aside that, NNPC is itself involved in oil exploration and therefore, 
possesses significant stakes in the exploration activities of the other major oil MNCs given that they 
operate on a Joint Venture agreement with the corporation. This raises serious questions and red flags 
 
222 See section 6 (3) of NOSDRA Act 
223 See report by the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre available at <https://business-
humanrights.org/en/shell-lawsuit-re-oil-spills-bodo-community-in-nigeria>  accessed January 15th 2018 
224 Amnesty International were among a retinue of International NGO that helped put pressure on Shell probably 
prompting it to settle 
225Bodo Community and Others v Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited [2014] EWHC 2170 (TCC)  
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of a conflict of interest, strongly supported by the myriads of avoidable environmental pollution cases 
that are down to weak regulatory oversight.226  
In the judicial arm of government, this ‘soft state’ syndrome is all-too-often reflected in their 
adjudication and application of legal principles, rules and norms to the advantage and protection of 
the oil MNCs. Two cases are highlighted below to drive this assertion home. 
The first is the case of Shell v Isaiah which was the first (reported) case on the issue of oil spillage to 
go all the way before Nigeria’s highest court, the Supreme Court of Nigeria (hereafter; SCoN)227. In 
this case, the plaintiffs/respondents commenced an action seeking remedy for the alleged pollution 
from the exploration activities of the Defendants/Appellants. The matter was commenced at the High 
Court of Rivers State pursuant to Decree No. 16 of 1992 which had restored jurisdiction to state high 
courts (such as the Rivers State High Court) to hear and determine cases pertaining to oil and gas and 
other mining related activities. Decree 16 thereby suspended the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on 
Federal High Courts by Decree No. 60 of 1991 on oil and gas related subject matters. However, 
midway into the hearing of this case (and motivated by the institution of this case as conspiracy 
theorists had alleged), a new decree, Decree No. 107 of 1993, was promulgated, which again ousted 
the jurisdiction of State High Courts on these sorts of subject matters and restored the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Federal High Courts to hear and determine them. Following the agelong SCoN 
principle ‘that the law applicable to an action is the law existing when the cause of action arose’, 228 the Rivers State 
High Court sustained its jurisdiction and went on to determine the dispute and (rightly) awarded 
damages against the oil MNC.  
 
226 See this 2009 report by Amnesty International at n 24; which confirmed this conflict of interest and its impediment of 
the NNPC’s regulatory functions. See generally section one of the report, caps 1 – 2; pp 7 - 20 
227 Suit No SC.75/1997 
228 See Adesina v Kola (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 298) 182 at 185 
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However, the SCoN dealt a big blow to the success of the plaintiff’s case when it departed from its 
own agelong principle to hold strangely, that Decree No. 107 of 1993, having ousted the jurisdiction 
of state high courts generally on oil and gas subject matters, had affected the jurisdiction of River State 
High court to determine the matter. This was irrespective that the cause of action had arisen, and the 
trial commenced way before Decree No. 107 came into force.229 By this singular decision, all cases 
determined by State high courts against oil MNCs pursuant to Decree 16 of 1992, for that 9 year-
period between the time of promulgation of the Decree (1992) and the time of handing down this 
judgment (in 2001), were defeated on the basis of this questionable pro-TREMF-paradigm 
technicality. Again, this is another flagrant instance where accountability mechanisms, this time 
through the judicial processes are being adjusted to the benefit of global capital.  
The said judgment resulted in nine (9) years of egregious human rights violations and catastrophic 
environmental degradation going by without any form of remedy on their merits, being accorded the 
victims. All cases of similar subject matter commenced at, or determined by, state High Courts had to 
be abandoned as an aftermath of the depraving judgment of the SCoN. The concept of ‘Locus Standi’ 
was another major technicality that the courts adopted in supplanting UDHR paradigm cum the socio-
economic rights of the people while projecting the pro-TREMF paradigm.  The concept was so 
narrowly interpreted and applied to the effect that only direct victims of oil-related mishaps (who are 
usually too poor, uneducated and lacking in means to institute and maintain actions in court) that must 
bring actions to seek remedy for such mishaps. Aside such direct victims, anyone else is termed a 
meddlesome interloper and the cases struck out or dismissed for a lack Locus standi on the part of the 
non-directly affected plaintiff.230  
 
229 Per Uthman Mohammed JSC 
230 See for instance the case of Oronto Douglas v Shell [1999] 2 NWLR prt 591. Mr. Douglas, a community leader and activist 
had instituted an action against Shell over a spillage resulting from one of its pipelines, but the case was defeated upon 
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The reasoning behind such TREMF-instigated and pro-global capital decisions may well be explained 
by the basis for the decision in this second case of Allar Irou v Shell B.P. 231 The trial court refused to 
grant an injunction against the Defendant/Respondent’s environmentally-damaging exploration 
activities on the reasoning that the utility in the crude oil exploration activity outweighed any 
environmental safety or human rights concerns of the Plaintiff/Applicants.232 Basically, the need to 
attain market efficiency was considered primal to the need to protect or enhance the human, 
environmental or socio-economic rights of the people. 
By and large, these illustrations underscore and exemplify the postulations of this sub-claim that trade 
liberalization and market efficiency (and other TREMF Paradigms) have been and are being pursued 
in the Niger Delta, to the detriment of the individual and/or collective socio-economic rights of the 
people. The analyses and instances highlighted all through this section are classic indications that the 
Nigerian state is deeply symptomatic of the “soft states” syndrome. The reason for this may be further 
gleaned from the postulation of the fourth sub-claim, that the attainment of these TREMF ideals has 
become the new standard by which a ‘good’ or ‘progressive’ state is determined.  
On the basis of the forgoing analysis, the TREMF theory and particularly this TREMF sub-claim, now 
assists us to understand the real reasons behind the seeming lack of effort on government’s part to 
resolve the protracted socio-economic issues in the Niger Delta, beyond the clichés and rhetoric of 
‘corruption’ and ‘lack of political will’ that are always cited for that.  
 
 
Shell’s preliminary objection to his locus standi to bring the matter since the spillage never affected him directly. The court 
agreed with Shell and dismissed the matter. 
231 Allar Irou v Shell B.P. Unreported Suit No. W/89/71 in the Warri High Court. 
232 Ibid at n 231 
60 
 
2.3.3  Sub-claim three: The Supplanting of Human Rights by the state vis-à-vis the ‘Internal 
Hardness’ Syndrome  
This sub-claim of the theory posits that the emergent TREMF paradigm instigates the protection of 
the ‘collective human rights’ of global capital at the expense of human rights of individuals or 
communities.233 From the preceding analysis done of the other sub-claims, the corollary is that 
violations of the human rights of human beings are the inevitable consequence of pursing the 
implementation of the TREMF paradigm. For instance, the need to secure market efficiency and 
‘maximize’ crude oil exploration is directly linked to the problems of ineffective or lax regulation and 
enforcement of environmental standards as well as brutal crackdown on the ensuing agitations; all of 
which amount by and large, to socio-economic rights violations.  
This is the phenomenon that Okafor described as the ‘reproduction of a core of internal hardness’ within the 
so called ‘soft states’ (i.e. ‘the internal hardness’ syndrome).234In other words, the ‘soft states’, weak in 
enforcing laws/regulations and protecting the human rights interests of its own citizens, hardens itself 
to supress and decimate the attempts of its citizens to resist the unbridled activities of global capital 
and the devastating impacts they have on them. The attendant syndrome as Baxi succinctly put it, is 
usually characterised by the states “de-legitimizing the human rights-based practices of resistance of its own 
citizens”.235 
Nigeria was infested with the ‘soft states’ syndrome on the adoption of Structural Adjustment Program 
in 1986 and as it adopted other forms of economic reforms by the subsequent administrations. In a 
bid to achieve the targeted increase in its crude oil production capacity as well as encourage more 
 
233 See Okafor’s essay on TREMF (supra) n215 
234 Ibid n 215 
235 Ibid n215 at 4 
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investment by the oil MNCs following its SAP,236 it adopted measures such as laxity in enforcement 
of environmental laws and regulations in its petroleum sector; leading to the proliferation of oil-related 
environmental pollutions and degradations in the region. Unsurprisingly, these prompted acts of 
resistance and growing agitation within the Niger Delta; crystalizing into the formation of the 
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) by Wiwa et al in 1990.237  
The government of Ibrahim Babangida at the time unleashed violent crackdown on the Ogoni activists 
prompting the President of MOSOP at the time, to allege that they were being visited with ‘genocide’.238 
As reported in the earlier chapter, the subsequent military regime of General Sanni Abacha took the 
‘internal hardness’ syndrome a notch higher, when he rounded up 9 MOSOP members including Ken 
Saro Wiwa, tried them before a military tribunal set up for that purpose and subsequently executed 
them on 10th November 1995 (the Wiwa execution).239    
This ‘internal hardness’ syndrome surely did not end with the military rule. The elected government 
of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo (and all the subsequent administrations)240 continued with the TREMF 
paradigm and the praxis of brutal clampdown on and suppression of, the human rights of the Niger 
Delta people to life, to protest and so on. A 2002 report of Human Rights Watch (HRW) had noted 
a failure of the Nigerian government upon return to democracy in 1999 to address ‘decades of neglect’ of 
the Niger Delta people and their socio-economic interests.241 That failure is indicative of the 
 
236 Ibid 201 at pp 54 - 58 
237 The centrepiece of MOSOP’s agitation is socio-economic and environmental Justice. See MOSOP’s operating 
document titled the Ogoni Bill of Rights, produced at their formation in 1990 and accessible here 
<http://www.bebor.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Ogoni-Bill-of-Rights.pdf> accessed 10th April 2018. 
238 See ‘Statement by Dr. G.B. Leton OON JP’ contained in the Ogoni Bill of Rights Ibid n 94 at p3 
239 See one of the numerous reports on the Wiwa execution here <http://www.dw.com/en/why-nigerian-activist-ken-
saro-wiwa-was-executed/a-18837442> accessed 7th May 2018 
240 Even then Candidate Buhari that opposed deregulation and removal of fuel subsidy has adopted it upon assuming 
office (although it was recently discovered that it continued to make unappropriated subsidy payments well into 2017)  
241 Human Rights Watch, ‘Nigeria, The Niger Delta: No Democratic Dividend’, (Oct. 2002) Vol 14. No 7(A) 
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persistence of the ‘soft states’ syndrome and the pursuit of market efficiency by the subsequent 
democratic governments. 
During the same Obasanjo’s administration, the not-so-widely reported but albeit, ruthless massacre 
and wanton destruction of properties in a small Niger Delta community of Odi reflects the persistence 
of the TREMF paradigm and the ‘internal hardness’ syndrome in particular, well into civilian rule.242 
Remonstrations against steep environmental degradations in their community led to an altercation 
between the indigenes of Odi, an oil company and members of the Nigerian Police. Unverified reports 
claimed that some policemen or soldiers were killed during the altercations. On that basis, the 
Obasanjo government deployed a detachment of the Nigerian Army combat personnel to the 
community. The Soldiers burnt all houses in the community (but for the church, bank and healthcare 
centre) and killed an uncertain number of unarmed civilians.243  
These two instances244 (during Military and civilian governments) are probably the most apposite 
(although extreme) exemplifications of this sub-claim. The broader inference is that the socio-
economic rights of the citizens are supplanted by the most brutal and crude means possible, mostly in 
order to protect and expand the collective rights of global capital. There is also the strategy of mass 
criminalization of many of the agitating youths, leading to wanton and indiscriminate arrests and 
indefinite detentions. This is reflected in the many high-profile arrests and prosecutions of key figures 
of the Niger Delta agitation such as Asari Dokubo and Henry Okah.245  
 
242See Report “Bombing: Delta community sends SOS to Buhari, NASS”, online: 
<https://newtelegraphonline.com/2017/05/bombing-delta-community-sends-sos-buhari-nass/> Available online here 
<https://newtelegraphonline.com/2017/05/bombing-delta-community-sends-sos-buhari-nass/> and accessed January 
20th. 
243 The number of those killed are said to be in their hundreds. See a Report by Human Rights Watch on the incident, 
available at <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/press/1999/dec/nibg1299.htm> Accessed January 15th 2018 
244 Wiwa et al’s execution and the Odi Massacre 
245 See Dokubo Asari v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2006). See also Henry Okah v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2007) on charge No. 
FHC/ABJ/ Cr/ 178/2007 
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Incidents of military invasions and aerial bombardment of Niger Delta communities persists well into 
the present administration of Muhammadu Buhari.246 These are actions that are geared towards 
ensuring the uninterrupted operation of the oil MNCs while paying little or no attention to the genuine 
and legitimate human rights-based grievances or concerns of the Niger Delta people.  
There may be the argument or inquiry into whether the case studies/instances cited above amounted 
to assigning more rights to MNCs or merely led to the securing of the rights of the oil MNCs (as 
contained in their Oil Prospecting Licenses or OPLs). Assuming but not conceding that this was a 
case of the later, it still does not hurt nor disturb the credibility of the TREMF postulations or theory. 
However, it is worth noting here that the rights granted by the OPL are not and have never been 
absolute. Such rights are meant to be exercised subject to the regulatory requirements that legislate 
against environmental degradation/pollution (the cardinal underlying reason for the 
agitations/protests) and subject to, or while respecting, the rights of others (especially the Niger Delta 
people and communities) to a safe environment guaranteed under the Nigerian Constitution247 and 
various applicable human rights instruments248. 
2.3.4 Sub-claim Four: ‘Soft States’ as the New ‘Progressive’ States  
This sub-claim postulates that there is a corresponding emergence of a new measurement paradigm 
for the progressiveness of states, which has enabled the prevalence of Pro-TREMF paradigm thoughts 
and actions in mostly the Global South, in Nigeria and even the rest of the world.  The success 
recorded by the TREMF paradigm in countries like Nigeria can be predicated on this shift in the 
paradigm or standards of measuring the progressiveness of (mostly) Global South states.  As Baxi has 
 
246 See Report note 101 Available online here <https://newtelegraphonline.com/2017/05/bombing-delta-community-
sends-sos-buhari-nass/> and accessed January 20th. 
247 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), s 20 
248 Such as the UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, The African Charter, the Nigerian Constitution and other national and 
international instruments. 
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stated, under the TREMF paradigm, the progressiveness of a state is now ‘measured by standards other 
than those provided by the endless human rights normativity’. 249 In other words, the progress of States is now 
measured in accordance with their successes or failures in implementing the TREMF paradigm. The 
end, in the case of the TREMF paradigm, apparently justifies the means; and this means includes many 
significant instances of gross human and socio-economic rights violations. 
To this end, it suffices to state that under the TREMF paradigm, states are commended for effectively 
implementing the emergent TREMF paradigm which inevitably requires or compels them to violate 
human rights of their human citizens. The corollary here is that human rights violations or suppression 
by states in their bid to implement the TREMF paradigm are effectively condoned. The only factors 
taken into account by this new progress measuring standards can be summarized in the following 
manner: 
i. how open/free/accessible a state makes its markets for agents of global capitalism 
ii. how much they protect global capital from social or political ‘unrests’ (usually in the forms of 
pro-human rights protests or agitations) 
iii. how much control they give to global capital and how less regulated they leave their 
operations/activities and so on. 
For these reasons, and a la Baxi, the plight of the subaltern becomes relegated to the background of 
irrelevancies, while global capital flourishes.250 Empirical evidence has shown that the consequences 
of implementing the emergent TREMF paradigm (as have been discussed in the preceding sections) 
are that the socio-economic wellbeing of the people is significantly undermined.  
 
249 U Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (2nd edn, OUP, New Delhi 2006) 252 
250 Ibid n249 
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Mrs. Thatcher confirmed this shifting standard of measurement when she lauded the Babangida 
regime as being ‘courageous’ for adopting and implementing the SAP251. Bear in mind, however, that 
this was a military dictatorship, notorious on its own merits, for poor human rights records and against 
which credible allegations of the state-sponsored killings of journalists, activists and opposition leaders 
had been made.252  Mrs. Thatcher remarked further that:253  
“[T]hese (economic) problems do not go away but, nevertheless, they do require boldness and courage to tackle and under 
President Babangida the Government of Nigeria has displayed that courage and we wish the programme every success 
and we are prepared to play our full part in it.”254 
This praise-laden remark supports the argument, albeit on a modest scale, that to the proponents of 
the TREMF paradigm, the determining yardstick for measuring the progress or growth or efficiency 
of a state/government is its success or achievements in implementing the TREMF paradigm. This 
prevailing new standard gives rise to the ‘studied ignorance or wilful acceptance’ phenomenon which 
Okafor applied to interrogate the condoning attitude of the TREMF proponents to problems of gross 
human rights abuses often occasioned by the implementation of the TREMF paradigm.255  
This shifting standard of progress measurement had shaped, if not totally influenced the Nigerian 
government’s actions in the Niger Delta context. Under both Babangida and Abacha, and prior to the 
Wiwa execution, Nigeria continued to enjoy the support and co-operation of its Global North (or first 
world) trading partners even as human rights were being trampled upon in the implementation of the 
pro-TREMF policies.  It was only after it went ahead in November 1995 and in defiance to pleas from 
around the world, to execute Wiwa et al that significant reactions emerged from the trading partners. 
 
251 See Mrs. Thatcher’s Speech Supra n195 
252 For instance; the assassination of prominent investigative Journalist, Dele Giwa. See report here 
<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/10/dele-giwas-assassination-the-verdict-of-history/> Accessed 7th March 2018 
253 Ibid n 195 
254 Emphasis mine 
255 Okafor (Supra) 
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In other words, the tipping point was the execution of the activists. The trading partners only reacted 
by withdrawing their ambassadors and imposing trade sanctions after, and probably only because of, 
the execution. This is suggestive and supportive of the argument, that there was an implied support 
(or at least condonation) of the gruesome clampdowns on rights which eventually lead up to the 
execution of the activists. Gerald LaMelle, then Deputy Executive Director at Amnesty International 
had described the Clinton Administration’s reaction to the entire Wiwa saga as ‘tepid and slow’.256 These 
‘tepid and slow’ reactions (or lack of reaction altogether) raise the probability that perhaps, had the 
regime not gone to the extreme with the Wiwa execution, business may have remained quite usual 
between Nigeria/the Abacha regime (with its abysmal human rights records at the time), the Bretton 
Woods Institutions and Nigeria’s foreign economic partners.  
More supportive of the reasoning above is the fact that Obasanjo, Yar’Adua, Jonathan and now Buhari 
invaded Niger Delta communities at some point and caused countless deaths/losses and that these 
actions never provoked any significant reaction or condemnation from Nigeria’s powerful trade 
partners (first world nations). The reasonable deduction to make from these facts is that indeed there 
is an altered standard of measuring progressiveness within mostly Global South states. These silences 
or condonations underscore how the UDHR paradigm of human rights, and the roles states are meant 
to play in its implementation have been supplanted by (and subordinated to) the emergent TREMF 
Human Rights paradigm.  
The silence or lack of robust condemnation on the part of the more powerful Global North countries 
(and the Bretton Woods Institutions) enables or emboldens the onslaughts unleashed on human rights 
as espoused in the UDHR and other relevant human rights instruments. They also support the 
 
256 CNN, ‘Nigeria Executes 9 Activists; The World Outraged’ See Report Here 
<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9511/nigeria/> Accessed 10th April 2018. Note however that President Clinton had 
called the Nigerian ruler and pleaded for clemency on behalf of the convicts. 
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argument that attaining the TREMF’s ideals (to wit protecting global capital from social and political 
unrest among others) are the new standards by which a progressive state is determined. In other words, 
that the obligation to protect and/or advance the UDHR paradigm of human rights have become less 
relevant.  
2.3.5 Chapter Two Summary 
This chapter has highlighted the socio-economic challenges faced by the Niger Delta people of 
Nigeria, which have arisen from the exploration of crude oil in their communities. It has applied the 
Baxian TREMF theory to illuminate some of the ‘background forces’ fuelling these agelong socio-
economic problems and militating against the prospects of evolving a truly durable and sustainable 
solution to address them. The theoretical analysis has demonstrated that the emergence and prevalence 
of a ‘trade-related, market friendly’ (TREMF) policies and obligations (amidst some other factors not 
the subject of this research’s enquiry) are at the heart of the protraction of the Niger Delta’s socio-
economic problems and the failure to adequately redress them.  
The UN ‘Ruggie’ ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework and its Guiding Principles (GPs) are the 
latest in a long line of instruments deployed to address business and human rights issues. The next 
chapter assesses how the application of the ‘Ruggie’ framework, and the GPs may assist in achieving 
a sustainable amelioration of the socio-economic problems in the Nigerian Niger Delta.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
A Critical Analysis of the Prospects of Socio-Economic Justice under the UN “Ruggie” 
Guiding Principles (in the Light of TREMF) in the Nigerian Niger Delta 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter assesses the potential of the UN “Ruggie” framework and the recommendations of its 
Guiding Principles (GPs) on Business and Human Rights to contribute toward the attainment of 
socio-economic justice in the Niger Delta. It examines both the potential and real impacts of the 
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ pillars respectively, in the light of the highlighted prevalence of the 
TREMF paradigm in the Niger Delta region.  In the grand scheme of this thesis, it provides answer 
to two subsets of the research question asking what, if any, are the likely obstacles to the successful 
application of the GPs in the Niger Delta region and what lessons may be learnt from the deployment 
or application of the GPs in the specific context of the Niger Delta socio-economic problems.  
The analysis takes an individual consideration of each of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” pillars 
and their respective GPs and assess their prospects in making practical contributions towards the 
attainment of socio-economic justice in the Niger Delta. 
3.2 The Protect Framework 
The ‘Protect’ framework reiterates the state’s duty flowing from its obligations under international 
human rights law ‘to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of individuals within their territory and/or 
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jurisdiction’.257 The ‘Protect’ duty was expounded with the aid of ten (10) Guiding Principles.258 The 
framework and its GPs are by no means, a binding human rights instrument but it (the foundational 
principle to be precise) did still make it clear that the states’ duty is one of a ‘must’ to protect against 
human rights violations by third parties, such as business enterprises.259   
However, the analyses conducted in chapter two of this thesis support a conclusion that the Niger 
Delta socio-economic problems (and arguably, most if not all, other business and human rights related 
problems across the globe) are as a result of impediments placed by the superseding TREMF 
Paradigms (i.e. the market efficiency and trade liberalization agenda) on the ability and willingness of 
the Nigerian State to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the 
Niger Delta people (i.e. the root problem). Ruggie himself had in his 2008 report admitted that:260  
 ‘[t]he root cause of the business and human rights predicament today lies in the governance gaps created by globalization– 
between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse 
consequences’. (Emphasis supplied) 
He went further to that assert these gaps create a ‘permissive environment for the wrongful acts by 
companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation’.261 
Whether you want to adopt the ‘TREMF root-problem’ theory of this thesis or Ruggie’s own ‘root 
cause’ theory presented above, they are coterminous in positing that there is a force; an invisible hand 
if you like, that is impeding states’ ability or willingness to fulfil their duties to protect the human rights 
 
257 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (New York and Geneva 2011) at 
p.1 Available at <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf>  last 
accessed on January 26th 2018 
 
258 Ibid n 257; pages 3 - 13 
259 Ibid n257 at 3 
260 UNHRCOR, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human 
Rights: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General [SRSG] on the Issue 
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie’ 
(2008) UN Doc A/HRC/8/5 at 3 
261 Ibid n 260 
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of their citizens from violations arising from the conducts and activities of global capital under 
international human rights law. To this thesis, they are the TREMF forces manifesting in the form of 
the limiting conditions and contents of the Joint Venture Agreements (JVAs) between the MNCs and 
State-owned Oil Corporation, (the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation) as well as the Oil 
Prospecting Licenses (OPL) granted by the Nigerian state, to the oil MNCs and TNCs operating in 
the Niger Delta, such as the stabilization clauses.262 These are then policed by threats or acts of capital 
flights and are enforced using the mechanism of international arbitration.263  
Therefore, a fair way to assess the potential or prospects of the framework and GPs is by examining 
what more leverage they can offer the Nigerian government so as to make it better able to effectively 
regulate the activities of the oil MNCs and TNCs that have been serially proven, to be inimical on the 
most part, to the socio-economic wellbeing of the Niger Delta people.264 
The principal argument here is that the ‘Protect’ framework and its GPs have contributed little (if 
anything), other than rehashing the well-known obligation of states under International (Human 
Rights) Law to protect and fulfil the human rights of its citizens. This position is taken for two major 
reasons. The first reason is the SRSG’s failure to at least, include a role for binding international human 
rights obligations in regard to corporations, despite it being within the purview of his mandate to do 
so.265 This is a failure that raises significant legitimacy concerns about the SRSG’s work at least, in the 
 
262 On the perils of Stabilization Clauses, see Evaristus Oshionebo, “Stabilization Clauses in Natural Resource Extraction 
Contracts: Legal, Economic and Social Implications for Developing Countries” (2010) 10 Asper Rev Int’l Bus & Trade L 
1. 
263 See this report of a research commissioned by the SRSG and conducted under the auspices of the IFC on the effect of 
Stabilization clauses on states’ ability to effectively protect against corporate human rights violations. A Shemberg, 
‘Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights: A Research Project Conducted for IFC and the United Nations Special 
Representative to the Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights’ (2008) 
<www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/p_StabilizationClausesandHumanRights/$FILE/Stabilization+Pa
per.pdf> (accessed 3 September 2011). 
264 This point has been robustly argued in chapter two of this thesis, as well as several reports, findings and judgments 
supporting this assertion, many of which have also been cited in various parts of this thesis 
265 See UNHRCOR, ‘Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises’ Res 8/7 (18 June 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/8/7, [4(a)–
(c)]. 
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view or from the perspectives of the people in the Global South; who represents the major 
demographic of victims of the most egregious business-related human rights violations.266 
Having himself identified the role of global capital (or globalization as he chose to call it), and the 
challenges of ‘capacity’ that ‘societies’ or states have in dealing with the impacts of the governance 
gaps that the said global capital creates, the eventual failure or refusal of the SRSG to elaborate a role 
for a binding corporate human rights obligation amounts to a betrayal of his mandate of some sort. It 
is one of the shortcomings of the framework and its Guiding Principles that exposes them to legitimate 
indictment as being no more than an exercise in further broadening the frontiers of the Trade-Related 
and Market-Friendly (TREMF) paradigms of human rights that Baxi espoused.267    
 The second reason is that whether deliberately or inadvertently; the SRSG may have by his choice of 
language in drafting the Guiding Principles (lingua-imprecision), watered down the pertinence of 
certain actions recommended to states by the GPs as a way of fulfilling their duty to protect. A striking 
instance is the use of ‘should’ in direct contrast to ‘must’ as the action word for nine (9) out of the ten 
(10) Guiding Principles for the ‘Protect’ framework. 268 Baxi had argued and quite rightly that ‘[c]larity 
of communication . . . is a most crucial resource for promotion and protection of human rights”.269 
Deva had also observed this ‘imprecision’ in the choice of language by the SRSG; noting that:270 
 ” [L]anguage is critical to human rights, because it embodies the basic ethos of human rights and . . . has also been one 
of the lenses for critiquing the politics of inclusion and exclusion in the human rights discourse”.271 
 
266 Penelope Simmons explored this line of argument in her article; “International Law’s Invisible Hand and the Future of 
Corporate Accountability for Violations of Human Rights” (2011) 3 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment at 19 
- 29  
267 U. Baxi, The Future of Human Rights, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, 2006) 
268 The Cambridge Online Dictionary gave these following uses of ‘Should’ 1. ‘used to show when something is likely or 
expected’ 2. Used to express that the action of the main verb is probable 3. Used to express that it is necessary, desirable 
or important to perform the action of the following verb (Emphasis by the author). Available online here 
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/should> Accessed last on 14th May 2019 
269 U. Baxi, The Future of Human Rights, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, 2006), 8. See also, 
on the power politics and perils surrounding the language of human rights, ibid., xix–xx. 
270 S. Deva 'Treating human rights lightly: A critique of the consensus rhetoric and the language employed by the Guiding 
Principles' (2011) 
271 Ibid n270 at 91 
72 
 
It is argued that this has a somewhat reductionist effect on the obligations flowing from such GPs. 
This rises from the fact that the foundational principle (GP 1) of the ‘Protect’ framework used ‘must’ 
as its operational verb. The switch from a ‘must’ to a ‘should’ not only presents a problem of precision 
but also has the potential to undermine or diminish (howbeit modestly), the significance of those set 
of Guiding Principles predicated on ‘should’ in contrast to the one predicated on ‘must’. Also, the 
language dynamics readily avails those nine GPs to a diluted or diminished interpretation. With Nigeria 
being notorious for its ‘soft states syndrome’272, this lingua-imprecision arms it with an excuse to treat 
duties/obligations flowing from those set of GPs as either being discretionary or those of which they 
have been accorded margins of appreciation.  
On the above note, one can understand why some critiques argue that the frameworks and GPs may 
have set the clock back on developing a robust response to the menace of corporate human rights 
violations.273 However, this thesis will not go as far as taking such a stand, as it believes that the 
framework and its GPs create a formidable building block, for future discussions, and further 
elaboration of the expectations and duties of corporations with respect to human rights even without 
expressly making any such provisions.274  
As with all non-binding international normative instruments, the framework and GPs have only 
enunciated business and human rights best practices (at best) that if implemented by the Nigerian 
state, have the potentials of improving the socio-economic situations of the Niger Delta people. 
However, the crux has always been how to get ‘soft states’ like Nigeria, who abdicates their human 
rights obligations in pursuit of trade liberalization and market efficiency policies to embrace and or 
 
272 This is a term employed by this thesis to describe the phenomenon whereby states, on taking on the onus of 
implementing TREMF policies to the benefit of global capital, at the same time abdicates their responsibilities to ensure 
the respect and fulfilment of human rights by those agents of global capital.  
273 For instance, Deva n270 
274 By Resolution 26/9 of 2014, the UN Human Rights Council has established an open-ended intergovernmental working 
group tasked with elaborating “an internationally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the 
activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises”. See Human Rights Council, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 (25 June 2014) 
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implement such normative frameworks. It is my considered view that there is little (or nothing) in the 
Protect framework or its Guiding Principles that incentivizes a pro-TREMF paradigm state like 
Nigeria to abide by its international human rights duties and obligations to the Niger Delta people 
more than the extent it did under the other numerous human rights normativity. Neither the 
framework nor its GPs enhances Nigeria’s immunity to the sweeping effects of the TREMF paradigm.  
Rather than increase Nigeria’s leverage to stand up to the debilitating effects of the TREMF forces, 
loopholes such as the lingua-imprecision highlighted above may have armed it with gateways to 
continue to evade its obligations to diligently and effectively enhance the socio-economic wellbeing 
of the Niger Delta people. The underlying research to this thesis did not find any credible evidence to 
show or suggest an improvement in the usual lackadaisical enforcement and regulation praxes of the 
Nigerian state, to the activities of the oil MNCs and TNCs operating in the Niger Delta.275  
3.3 The Respect Framework 
The ‘Respect’ framework illuminates the responsibility of business enterprises to respect human 
rights. The foundational principle of the ‘Respect’ Framework states that:  
“[Corporations’ responsibility to respect human rights] exists independently of States’ abilities and/or willingness to 
fulfil their own human rights obligation and . . . it exists over and above compliance with national laws and regulations 
protecting human rights”.276  
This assertion presented in the foundational principle is perhaps the single most important 
pronouncement of the framework and the Guiding Principles. It settles (to an extent) the debate 
 
275 Aside the establishment of a draft National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights in 2017, there is no single 
recommendation flowing from the framework of its Guiding Principles that has been implemented by the Nigerian State. 
Document available online here <https://globalnaps.org//wp-content/uploads/2017/11/nhr-national-action-plan.pdf> 
Accessed on 10th May 2019. 
276 Ibid n260 at 13 
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around whether business enterprises have any human rights responsibility that goes beyond obedience 
to existing national laws. The consensus (manufactured or not)277 and massive endorsement278 that it 
received from the corporate community presents, at the very least, a legitimate goodwill and building 
block towards a more robust corporate human rights accountability.  
Another remarkable innovation of the Guiding Principles was its recommendation for businesses to 
conduct Human Rights Due Diligence (HRDD) assessments “in order to identify, prevent, mitigate 
and account for how they address their adverse human rights impacts”.279 It recommends pre-emptive 
impact assessments (GP 18), involvement of and consultations with groups at risk of rights violation, 
feedback/findings integration (GP 19) as well as a progress monitoring/tracking mechanism (GP 20), 
among other commendable recommendations around this point.280 The requirement to consult or 
involve groups at risk is a commendable element that has the potentials of guaranteeing the objectivity 
of the HRDD assessments.  
 
277 This is the crux of Deva’s critique of the framework and the Guiding Principles in his article ‘Treating Human Rights 
Lightly . . .’ n 270 above 
278 see for example the International Organisation of Employers, (Address to the UN Human Rights Council, delivered at 
the Palais des Nations in Geneva,Switzerland, 31 May 2011) 
<webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/seventeenth/ 
hrc110531am1-eng.rm?start=01:59:04&end=02:02:45> (accessed 3 September 2011), who ‘Supports the approach taken 
in the principles to elaborate the implications of existing standards and practice into practical guidance rather than seeking 
to create new international legal obligations or seek to assign legal liability’. See also the range of letters from business 
actors endorsing the Guiding Principles, including Coca Cola (Statement by Edward Potter (Personal Communication 26 
May 2011) <www.global-businessinitiative.org/SRSGpage/files/Guiding%20Principles% 
20Endorsement%20from%20Coke.pdf> (accessed 3 September 2011)); and Total (Statement by Peter Herbl (Personal 
Communication 23 May 2011) <www.global-business-initiative.org/ 
SRSGpage/files/Total%20S%20A%20letter%20to%20John%20Ruggie.pdf> accessed 3 September 2011)). On the 2008 
framework, see for example, International Chamber of Commerce, International Organization of Employers & Business 
and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD ‘Joint Initial Views of the International Organisation of Employers (IOE), 
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC) 
to the Eighth Session of the Human Rights Council on the Third report of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-
General on Business and Human Rights’ (Report) (May 2008) <www.reports-and-materials.org/Letter-IOE-ICC-BIAC-
re-Ruggie-report-May-2008.pdf> (accessed 3 September 2011). 
279 See n 260; Guiding Principle 17 
280 See n 260; Guiding Principles 18 -20 
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Guiding Principle 20 implied a disclosure responsibility on corporations.281 It recommended that 
corporations verify the effectiveness of their response to adverse human rights impacts identified in 
the HRDD Assessments through inter alia “feedback from internal and external sources, including affected 
stakeholders”.282 This is one way that vital information about corporate human rights violations can 
become more readily available for different reasons; ranging from education to research and even for 
litigation and other efforts aimed at greater corporate accountability for adverse human rights impacts. 
The optimism being expressed here is mitigated by the fact that the framework and its Guiding 
Principles are all but binding on the corporations and there is no enforcement mechanism in place to 
ensure that they are implemented.  
As if the non-binding nature of the recommendations are not enough, Guiding Principle 3d went a 
step further to water down the duty of states with respect to requiring or demanding these disclosures 
from corporations.283 In addition to its use of the less-emphatic action word ‘should’; it only requires 
to the states ‘to encourage, and where appropriate require, business enterprises to communicate how 
they address human rights impacts’.284 This, once more, feeds into the lingua-imprecision shortcoming 
of the GPs (as highlighted above) and seems to support Deva’s position that the framework and GPs, 
to a large extent, [treated] human rights lightly.285  
Aside the argument that the use of ‘should’ de-emphasizes the imperativeness of the recommended 
obligation, the imprecise phrasing of Guiding Principle 3d is a recipe for indolence on the part of 
states, in the pretext of only ‘encouraging’ disclosure or their outright abdication from requiring 
disclosure from corporations on the ground that it is not appropriate to do so.  It remains a 
 
281 Ibid n 260 at 23 
282 Ibid n 260, GP 20 at 23 
283 Ibid n 260 at p5 
284 Ibid n 260 
285 Ibid n 270. 
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conundrum what factors or circumstances the SRSG thought would make it inappropriate to demand 
or require a corporation whose activities have been found to have an adverse human rights impact to 
disclose how that impact is being addressed. This qualification could again provide support, howbeit 
modestly, to why the framework and its GPs may be susceptible to insinuations of propagating the 
‘trade-related and market-friendly’ (TREMF) agenda. 
There is no available concrete evidence of improvements in the conduct of the oil MNCs operating 
in the Niger Delta with respect to their responsibility to respect human rights. If anything, the oil 
MNCs and TNCs are doubling-down in frustrating efforts intended to bring them to account through 
extra-territorial litigations for instance. In HRH Eze Godwin Okpabi & Ors v Royal Dutch Shell; Royal 
Dutch Shell successfully mounted a challenge (in the English Court of Appeal) that the English Courts 
lacked the jurisdiction to hear the case against its Nigerian subsidiary Shell Petroleum Development 
Corporation (SPDC) over catastrophic oil spillages in the Niger Delta communities of Ogale and 
Bille.286  
It is noted that there are cleaning operations that are currently ongoing in some polluted Niger-Delta 
communities. However, it must be highlighted that those were not a product of voluntary and 
thoughtful conduct on the part of the relevant TNCs but the result of another hard and long fought 
litigation against Shell in an English Court.287  Shell opted to settle that instant case out of court in 
 
286 [2018] EWCA Civ 191. Appeal on this case is however pending before the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom 
(UKSC). The UKSC had put hearing on this matter on hold to decide another case on significantly similar point of Law 
Lungowe & Ors v Vedenta & Anor [2019] UKSC 20 in which Lord Briggs (with whom all the other Law Lords agreed) held 
(obiter) and to the optimism of the Litigants in the Okpabi case that 1. The categories of cases where a parent company 
might owe a duty of care to third parties harmed by the activities of its subsidiaries transcends the two circumstances 
where the parent company (a) has effectively taken over management of, or (b) given relevant advice to the subsidiary 
(AAA v Unilever PLc [2018] EWCA Civ 1532) and 2. That the consideration of where access to substantive justice will 
avail a litigant trumps all the other considerations in determining the appropriate forum to try cases involving parent 
company and its subsidiary domiciled in different jurisdictions.   
287 Bodo Community & Others v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nig Ltd [2014] EWHC 2170 (TCC) 
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2015 after the court rejected its preliminary objection.288 Shell also went back to court in 2018 and 
failed in their attempt to block the community’s option to return to court should their terms of 
settlement not fully complied with by Shell.289  
The fact that it was only through (extra-territorial) litigation that Shell got to accept responsibility and 
began to remedy its egregious violations in these Niger Delta communities probably adds to the 
strength of the case in favour of a legally binding instrument, as the ultimate panacea for corporate 
human rights violations.  
3.4 The Remedy Framework 
The ‘Remedy’ framework and Guiding Principle 25 in particular, mandates states290to ensure the 
availability of, and access to, ‘judicial, administrative, legislative and other appropriate means’ of redress for 
business-related human rights violations within the states’ ‘territory and/or jurisdiction’.291 The relevant 
mechanisms need to be effective. To widen access to such effective remedies, the Guiding Principles 
(GPs) also recommended that states establish or ensure the availability of equally effective and 
accessible non-judicial and non-state remedy mechanisms.292 Business enterprises are admonished to 
establish ‘effective operational-level grievance mechanisms’ for early and direct remedy to victims impacted by 
their operations.293 
 
288 See report here online< https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-delta-environment/anger-seethes-on-margins-of-
historic-clean-up-in-nigerias-delta-idUSKBN1D81WF> Last accessed on 14th May 2019 
289 Report available online here <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-shell-nigeria-spill/nigerias-bodo-community-
claims-win-over-shell-after-latest-uk-court-ruling-idUSKCN1IP2SP> Last accessed on 14th May 2019 
290 Here; ‘must’ was used as opposed to ‘should’ 
291 note 260 at 27. 
292 Ibid n260 at 31 -33 
293 note 260 at 31 GP 29. The Guiding Principle also recommended that other extra-legal corporate human rights 
advancement efforts, such as human rights monitoring and evaluation standards (set through ‘Industry, multi-stakeholder 
and other collaborative initiatives’) should include effective remedial mechanisms  
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Guiding Principle 26 charges states ‘to ensure the effectiveness of domestic judicial mechanisms’ for redressing 
business related human rights violations.294 To do this, states are to ensure that they eliminate or ‘reduce 
legal, practical and other relevant barriers that could lead to a denial of access to remedy’.295 Clearly the Guiding 
Principles recognizes that there is a difference between the availability of remedial mechanisms and 
access to them. 
The principal mechanism for the redress of human rights violations in Nigeria is usually through the 
court/judicial system. By a combined effect of sections 6 (6) and 46 of Nigeria’s constitution, the high 
court (and other courts of coordinate jurisdiction) has jurisdiction to hear matters concerning 
human/fundamental rights.296 There has been slow but steady growth of other alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms such as mediation, conciliation and arbitration in Nigeria from the last decade. 
However, these are rarely applied to causes relating to human rights. 
As already highlighted, the Guiding Principle made a distinction between availability and access of the 
‘remedy’ mechanisms. Now, in terms of availability, there are state and federal high courts in all 36 
states of Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). The state high courts are usually fairly 
sited/located on an even spread to enhance access by the rural communities/population.  
The introduction of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules 2009 in Nigeria made 
giant efforts in eliminating some of the notable barriers towards litigating human rights violations in 
Nigeria. Amongst other reforms, it eliminated the time limitation barrier and introduced a limitless 
period for bringing human rights actions.297 It also eliminated the bottleneck around the mode of 
commencement of action such that human rights enforcement actions may now be commenced by 
 
294 Ibid n260 at 29 
295 Ibid n260 at 29 
296 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (As Amended) 
297 See Order 3 Rule 2 of the FREP Rules 2009 
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any of the established modes.298 The filing fee was also reduced by over 300% from what it used to be 
under the 1979 FREP Rules. 
The giant strides of the FREP 2009 rules notwithstanding, there are still some notable legal and 
practical barriers towards an effective judicial human rights enforcement in Nigeria; which even the 
advent of the framework and its GPs have not influenced their removal. There are the legal bottlenecks 
of jurisdiction and locus standi299, which links into other practical barriers such as accessibility of the 
courts.  
The Supreme Court of Nigeria (SCoN) in the case of Adetona and Ors v Igele General Enterprises have 
essentially ousted the jurisdiction of state high courts to entertain human rights issues arising from 
crude oil.300 It held thus: 
[A} High Court of a state shall lack jurisdiction to entertain matters of fundamental rights, although brought pursuant 
to section 46(2) of the Constitution where the alleged breach of such matters arose from a transaction or subject matter 
which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as provided by section 251 of the Constitution”.301 
Section 251 (n) of the Constitution grants exclusive jurisdiction to the federal high courts on matters 
relating to ‘mines and minerals (including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas)’.302  The corollary 
is therefore that human rights violations relating to oil mining and/or natural gas, on the authority of 
the Adetona (Supra) lies within that exclusive jurisdiction of the federal high court.303 
 
298 Be it writ, originating summons or motion. See Order 2 Rule 1 of the FREP Rules 2009 
299 In Oronto Douglas v Shell [1999] 2 NWLR Part 591; the plaintiff approached the court to require the respondents to 
comply with an Environmental Impact Assessment requirement of their gas liquification project. However, the case was 
defeated on the technicality that the plaintiff lacked locus standi because he did not hail from the community where the 
project was taking place and neither has he shown any potential harm to himself. 
300 (2011) 7 NWLR. This judgment has essentially overruled the former and more favourable position in Grace Jack v Federal 
University of Agric. Makurdi (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 208 
301 Per Ibrahim Tanko Muhammad JSC at page 45 -47 at para A – G of Adetona case (Supra) 
302 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (As amended) 
303 Adetona and Ors v Igele General Enterprises (2011) 7 NWLR 
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Federal high courts are situated in the capital cities of the respective 36 Nigerian states and the 
highbrow city centre of the capital city, Abuja. The capital-cities of the 36 Nigerian states are usually 
a significant distance from its surrounding towns, communities or villages; most of where these crude 
oil explorations happen. In the particular context of the Niger Delta, bear in mind that they grapple 
with some of Nigeria’s worst infrastructural challenges.304 This is in addition to the fact that most 
communities in the area are riverine and so rely on local water-based means of transport such as by 
canoes, jetties, boats etc.305 
The location factor may only be appreciated in the light that the federal high court now has exclusive 
jurisdiction to entertain crude oil related human rights cases.306 This is therefore where the location 
and localization policy of the federal high courts becomes a practical impediment to access for victims. 
This is also bearing in mind the high cost of legal services in Nigeria and the substantial disparity in 
the economic wherewithal of the victims compared to the oil MNCs and TNCs. 
Distance aside, there is also the prevailing feeling (be it rightly or wrongly) that some (if not most) 
federal judges are deferent to the policy body-languages of the executive which is usually pro-the oil 
MNCs. A perfect paradigm of this is the trial, conviction and sentencing to death in the Wiwa (supra) 
trial. Although General Sanni Abacha was the ultimate villain of their execution, however a federal 
judge and indeed the immediate past Chief Judge of the Federal High Court was the indelicate tool 
used by the Abacha government (as Judge of the military tribunal) to achieve its aim of a death 
sentence.307 
 
304 Adangor, Z. “The Petroleum Industry Bill 2012 and the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: Panacea or Placebo” (2015) 38 
JL Pol’y & Globalization [i] 
305 Ibid n304 
306 Ibid n304 
307 Justice Ibrahim Auta was appointed Acting Chief Judge of the Federal High Court in 2011 and subsequently the 
substantive Chief Judge until his retirement in 2017. See this report by Sahara Reporters at 
<http://saharareporters.com/2011/03/16/ken-saro-wiwa-killer-judge-becomes-acting-chief-judge-nigeria> Accessed on 
25th January 2018  
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Another factor seriously hampering access to this judicial remedy is the lack of an effective right-based 
approach to accessing legal aid in Nigeria. A former chairman of Nigeria’s Legal Aid Council was 
quoted in a 2016 Newspaper interview as advocating for Legal Aid ‘to be elevated to the level of a fundamental 
right’.308 Even if this is made possible; the other unspoken snag is that legal services provided by the 
Legal Aid Council are mostly substandard, inadequate and unfit for the sort of complex issues that 
usually underline the human rights violations in discourse.309 This is because of the obvious challenges 
that the council face such as funding, and dearth of expertise as a number of the council’s lawyers are 
usually inexperienced and new to the profession.310 
Aside the issue of access, the Nigerian Judicial system is notorious for its snail-speed rate of handling 
cases. There is also the lack of trust and confidence, as well as the corruption that has impugned the 
public’s perception of the judiciary. This perception may have even deepened following the recent 
ouster and conviction of former Chief Justice, Walter Onnorghen on corruption related offences311 
and the 2016 raid of some high-profile judicial officers by Nigeria’s secret police on allegations of 
corruption.312 These developments have a knock-on effect on the willingness of victims to seek 
redress.  
 
308 M Agbanuche-Mbu, J Igbanoi and T Soniyi, ‘Legal Aid Should be Elevated to the Level of Fundamental Right’ (This 
Day Newspaper, Lagos Nigeria) Published May 10 206 and accessible here 
<https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/05/10/legal-aid-should-be-elevated-to-the-level-of-a-fundamental-
right/> Accessed on January 20th 2018 
309 U Ukong, ‘Poor Nigerian lack Access to Justice-Legal Aid’ (Nigerian Pilot Newspaper, Lagos Nigeria) Published July 
22nd 2017 and available here <http://nigerianpilot.com/poor-nigerians-lack-access-to-justice-legal-aid-council/> 
Accessed on 20th January 2018 
310 Ibid n137. The present Director General of the Council alluded to this fact when she stated that “ . . . lawyers are not 
enough to attend to the needs of the indigent persons in a country of over 170 million. . .” 
311 In Federal Republic of Nigeria v Hon. Justice Walter S.N. Onnorghen (2019). He has since resigned after Nigeria’s apex Judicial 
regulatory body, the National Judicial Council (NJC) unanimously found him wanting on allegations of corruption levelled 
against him. He is however appealing his conviction before the Nigerian Superior Courts. See report here 
<https://punchng.com/breaking-cct-convicts-onnoghen-sacks-him-as-cjn/> Accessed last on 12th May 2019. 
312 Most of the charges were however either dropped or lost in court (on technicalities). See detailed report of raid here 
<http://saharareporters.com/2016/10/08/full-details-nigerian-secret-police-raid-federal-judges-revealed> Accessed 
January 28th 2018 
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There is also the perception that, giving the spate of arrest and trial of judges in Nigeria, the executive 
has begun a process of intimidating the judiciary and is now (more or less) able to get the judiciary to 
do whatever the executive demands. In a country like Nigeria where events of the past and empirical 
evidence show how closely interlinked the state (federal government) is with the oil MNCs, it is not 
difficult to see, in an environment of purported judicial subjugation as currently exists in Nigeria, why 
access to effective remedy might be an allusion.313 This may not be unconnected to why many Niger 
Delta communities are placing their hopes in extra-territorial litigation rather than approach a Nigerian 
court.314 
With all these litany of barriers and impediments to accessing remedy in Nigeria; there is nothing upon 
diligent research for the purpose of this thesis, that point to any serious or significant reforms that are 
being undertaken by the Nigerian state for the purpose of widening access to remedy or making the 
available remedial mechanisms more effective either generally and of its own volition or  particularly 
for business-related human rights violations, in adherence to the recommendations of the UN 
framework and its Guiding Principles. 
3.5  Summary of Chapter Three 
This chapter has argued essentially that the lingua-imprecision of, and the voluntary nature of the 
responsibilities assigned to corporations by, the Framework and Guiding Principles, as well as some 
peculiar problems relating to access to remedy generally in Nigeria, mean that the UN framework and 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights may have contributed little or nothing to 
improving the socio-economic wellbeing of the Niger Delta people. The next chapter, which is the 
 
313 A modest pointer to this theory is the case of Shell v Isaiah extensively analyzed in Chapter Two 
314 See cases such as Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum (2013) 569 US; In Bodo Community and Others v Shell Petroleum Development 
Company of Nigeria Limited [2014] EWHC 2170 (TCC) and HRH Bebe Okpabi and Ors v Royal Dutch Shell PLC & Anor [2017] 
EWHC 89 TCC 
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final chapter of this thesis will conclude by summarizing the key points of the analyses done so far as 
well as offer recommendations on the nagging issue of how best to effectively deal with the menace 
of corporate human rights violations globally and particularly within the Niger Delta context.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Summary and Recommendations: Ways Forward for Socio-Economic Justice in the 
Niger Delta.   
4.0  Summary of the Thesis 
This chapter summarizes the arguments developed in this thesis, as outlined in chapters one to three. 
Following this precis, it proffers recommendations on the most effective and realistic ways of 
achieving sustainable corporate human rights accountability on the global space, which will in turn, 
improve the possibilities of attaining socio-economic justice for the people of the Niger Delta. 
Chapter one laid out the major problem this research intended to tackle. It outlined a historical 
background of the crude oil exploration in the Niger Delta and the attendant pitfalls, by way of 
environmental degradations and human rights violations, that have characterised the exploration of 
the said crude oil since inception. Going by the provisions of Article 12 (2) b of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and Article 24 of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples Rights (the Charter),315 these environmental degradations were subsumed into 
the more nuanced Niger Delta human rights violation discursivity; and given the term socio-economic 
injustice. 
Applying the Rawls theory of Justice,316 the thesis defined socio-economic justice (the opposite of 
socio-economic injustice) as “measures, mechanisms and/or actions that are designed to deal with the consequences 
of crude oil exploration in the Niger Delta in order to foster distributive equality of resources”.317 This definition 
frames the analyses in the rest of this thesis. 
 
315 Both of which establishes right to a healthy and satisfactory environment 
316 Rawls J, ‘A Theory of Justice’ Rev edn (Harvard University Press, 1999) 
317 Chapter one p 8 
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The same chapter one also defined the scope of the research and breadth of the analyses conducted 
in the thesis and outlined the research questions that animate it. These questions, once again, are: 
i. What socio-economic injustices exist within the crude oil exploration sector in the Nigerian Niger Delta and 
what gives rise to them? 
ii. What is the potential of the GPs in helping to achieve sustainable socio-economic justice in the region?  
iii. What, if any, are the likely obstacles to the successful application of the GPs in the circumstances and how may 
those obstacles (if any) be circumvented? 
iv. What lessons emerge from the deployment or application of the GPs in this specific Niger Delta context that 
support or impeach the debate for or against a binding international business and human rights treaty? 
Chapter Two dealt with questions (i) and (iii). In answering question (i); It gave a vivid outline of the 
various rights violations (amounting therefore to socio-economic injustice) going on as a result of 
crude oil explorations in the Niger Delta. It separately adumbrated the environmental-based violations, 
and the other actions amounting to violations of human rights in the orthodox sense, as provided for 
in the various international, continental and national human/fundamental rights normative and 
legislative instruments.318 
In answering research question (iii); a number of theses (four sub-claims), emanating from Upendra 
Baxi’s theory on the emergence (or prevalence as it now seems) of a trade-related and market friendly 
(TREMF) paradigm of human rights, were deployed to explain the relationship between the 
prevalence of these socio-economic injustices and the Nigerian government’s seeming failure or 
inability to address them.  
 
318 Such as rights to food, water; right to freedom of expression, assembly and protest; rights to ownership of property 
and procedural rights in the allocation and use of own resources etc 
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It argued that the Nigerian government, as with most Global South governments, has caught the fever 
occasioned by its fidelity to the TREMF paradigm; which is aimed at entrenching market efficiency 
and trade liberalization at almost any cost. The assumption of this type of obligation is usually sold to 
Global South governments as the ultimate panacea for the crippling economic woes that they too 
often experience.  Adherence to this TREMF paradigm is all-too-often made a pre-condition for trade 
with, and sometimes for aid and grants from, the powerful nations of the Global North. Even their 
receipt of the economic stimulus packages offered by the Bretton Woods institutions is equally all-
too-often preconditioned on their adherence to the TREMF paradigm; to the extent that even if these 
governments wanted, they could not afford not to toe that line. 
Chapter two traced Nigeria’s adherence to the TREMF paradigm back to when it negotiated and 
adopted the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1986, under the regime of then Military Head 
of State, General Ibrahim Babangida. It showed that starting from then, successive Nigerian 
regimes/administrations have pursued policies in facilitation of this market efficiency and trade 
liberalization (which are key elements of the TREMF paradigm). This was done mostly by the 
adoption of the 3-Ds of disinvestment, deregulation and denationalisation(privatisation) – a praxis 
that earns them the status of a ‘soft state’.319  
A state qualifies as a ‘soft state’ when it neglects or abdicates its redistributive role (a la Baxi), which 
is ‘to construct . . . a just social order . . . that will at least meet the basic needs of human beings’ under the paradigm 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and other numerous human rights 
normativity.320 According to the arguments made in chapter two, the Nigerian state has done so 
through its weak, and sometimes non-existent, regulatory oversight and enforcement mechanisms 
 
319 This is a term employed by this thesis to describe the phenomenon whereby states, on taking on the onus of 
implementing TREMF policies to the benefit of global capital, at the same time abdicates their responsibilities to ensure 
the respect and fulfilment of human rights by those agents of global capital. 
320 Baxi U, ‘The Future of Human Rights’ (New Delhi 2002) at 139 
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against the activities of the multinational and transnational oil companies (MNCs and TNCs) operating 
in the Niger Delta. 
In furtherance of these efforts, the government too often meets attempts by the people to demand or 
assert their legitimate human rights (be it via protests or advocacies), with stiff and brutal clampdowns; 
often resulting in horrific and egregious human rights abuses such as the Wiwa execution perpetrated 
by the Abacha regime and the destruction of Odi community by the Obasanjo administration. These 
incidences of rights violations are regarded a ‘necessary evil’ as evidenced by the ‘studied ignorance or 
wilful acceptance’ of ‘the saviours’ – the powerful Global North states that hitherto masqueraded as 
the arch-custodians of universal human rights.321  
Chapter Two further argued that Global North states, usually turn blind eyes to the egregious rights 
violations that tend to characterize the operation of the TREMF Paradigm. This usually means that in 
their eyes, a state’s human rights record matters much less than the degree or rate of its successes in 
implementing the TREMF policies. To that end, TREMF essentially becomes the new yardstick for 
measuring or determining state progress. This paradigm shift in the measurement of state progress, 
the chapter argued, bolsters the weak regulatory frameworks, near-lack of enforcements and egregious 
rights violations which characterize socio-legal life in the Niger Delta region. This is because to Nigeria 
and similar states; market efficiency and trade liberalization have become more of a superior policy 
objective to pursue than the protection or enhancement of human rights.     
With these points in mind, chapter three set out to provide answers to research questions (ii) and (iv). 
In answering question (ii), a critical analysis of the UN framework (the framework) and its Guiding 
 
321 Wakau Wa Mutua’s metaphor of the ‘saviors’ is being adopted here to refer to the powerful Global North States (and 
the Bretton Woods Institutions) who seems to push the narratives of human rights more than most but are in this case, 
the propagators of the TREMF Paradigms giving rise to the TREMF paradigm that essentially undermines the Human 
Rights as theorised under the paradigm of the UDHR; thereby qualifying also as ‘the savages’ in this case, if the race factor 
in the definition of a savage is discounted. See Mutua W, ‘Savages, Victims and Saviours: The metaphor of Human Rights’ 
(2001) Harvard Int.Law Journal, Vol 42 for a full analysis of this metaphor.  
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Principles (GPs) on business and human rights was conducted. Bearing in mind the analysis done in 
chapter two on the role of TREMF paradigm in the Niger Delta situation, the potential of the 
framework and Guiding Principles in making a meaningful impact on the attainment of socio-
economic justice in the Niger Delta was systematically explored. 
In relation to the ‘Protect’ Framework, it was argued in that chapter that the GPs made no novel 
contribution other than to rehash the long well-known duties of states to protect human rights within 
their territories. It was also argued in that chapter that the choice of the language used in parts of the 
GPs may have diminished the import of some of the actions that states are essentially required to take 
in fulfilling their obligations to protect human rights under international law. It made reference to the 
use of ‘must’ as the action word in GP 1 and then the subsequent switch to ‘should’ for the rest of the 
GPs under the protect framework and argued that this can open the door to a diluted or diminished 
implementation, or even non-implementation of those GPs by states; on the argument that the use of 
‘should’ presupposes that they have discretions or margins of appreciation in implementing or abiding 
by them.  
On the ‘Respect’ Framework; it found that the framework and GPs have the potential to contribute 
to the attainment of socio-economic justice in the Niger Delta, only to the extent that the oil TNCs 
operating in the area sincerely abide by the recommendations of the Guiding Principles. It, however, 
found no evidence that could suggest an active implementation of the GPs recommendations in the 
Niger Delta. It argued that if anything, the behaviour of most of the oil TNCs, particularly Shell, in 
the litigations it has recently faced in the UK over oil spillage in the Niger Delta, 322 are more indicative 
of a resort to the old approach of repressing and frustrating the efforts of the communities at making 
 
322 Viz: the Bodo Community oil spill Case and the Ogale/Bille (i.e.Okpabi v Shell) case 
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them accountable, than it is of any shift/change towards a  more human rights-friendly or human 
rights compliant approach. 
Under the ‘Remedy’ framework, an in-depth analysis of the encumbrances to accessing the available 
remedial mechanisms in Nigeria generally, and particularly for the Niger Delta people was conducted. 
The well-documented problems of the Nigerian judicial/court system (viz slow-pace, corruption and 
lack of independence) were reiterated. Some structural barriers to access to effective remedies (such 
as judicial interpretations of key legal concepts such as jurisdiction323 and locus standi324) were also 
discussed. It concluded that there was no evidence to point towards any structural or systemic reform 
of the Nigerian judicial system in response to the recommendations of the ‘Remedy’ framework and 
the GPs. 
All the findings in chapter three culminate in an answer for research question (iv); to the effect that 
so much as the framework and GPs hold promise (where implemented) of improving the adverse 
human rights impacts of corporate activities, the ultimate panacea lies in a binding human rights 
instrument as is being currently explored based on UN resolution 26/9 of 2014.325 The only evidence 
of a positive action by an oil TNC in the Niger Delta vis-à-vis, cleaning of the oil spill communities, 
was a result of a court action. The Nigerian state of itself, has not initiated any process or improved 
on existing mechanisms to secure a more just socio-economic order in the Niger Delta. These points 
coupled with the structural problems highlighted in relation to access to judicial remedy in Nigeria, 
 
323 Per Adetona v Igele Enterprises [2011] 7 NWLR ousting the jurisdiction of High Courts of the various states of the 
federation to entertain human rights cases relating to mining (i.e. petroleum) and vesting same exclusively on the Federal 
High Court. 
324 Per Oronto Douglas v Shell [1999] 2 NWLR Part 591; here locus standi was no narrowly interpreted that only the direct 
victims of socio-economic injustice (poor and uneducated in the most case), can bring actions to demand remedy. 
325 Resolution 26/9 of 2014 refers to the UN Human Rights Council resolution (advocated by the Republic of Ecuador 
and co-signed by the Republic of South Africa) that established an open-ended intergovernmental working group tasked 
with elaborating “an internationally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises”. See Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 
(25 June 2014) 
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strongly support the case for a binding human rights instrument to regulate the activities of TNCs and 
other business enterprises in my opinion.  
4.1 Recommendations on the Proposed Binding Treaty 
Having adopted a stand in favour of a binding instrument, clarification is needed as to what exactly is 
being advocated for with respect to such binding instrument. I concur with the prevailing argument 
that the duty to protect human rights should primarily remain that of the political state. However, the 
extent and contours of this duty with respect to corporate activities, is what a binding instrument 
needs to elaborate on. 
Any such binding instrument needs to re-emphasize the universality of human rights and the 
corresponding universality of the duty or obligation or responsibility to protect and respect them. In 
other words, a binding business and human rights instrument should create an overarching universal 
duty (with no territorial or geographic limit) on states to protect and on corporate entities to respect 
human rights. This would mean on the one hand, that all states will have equal duties to protect human 
rights against violations or adverse human rights impacts flowing from the activities of business 
entities. To this end, the duty of a host state and that of a home state will be complementary and 
somewhat commensurate. 
On the other hand, the responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights will, as the GPs 
propounded, be interpreted over and above the minimalist provisions in the respective national laws 
where they operate. This in practice will entrench an extra-territorial uniform standard of 
responsibility, regulation and enforcement. The consequence of this universal approach to the 
imposition of duties, obligations and responsibilities, is that enforcement would also have to be 
universal. The implication of a truly universal business and human rights enforcement paradigm will 
be that the barriers currently placed by the concept of geographic jurisdiction (or forum convenience) on 
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attempts to enforce human rights obligations against corporations (via litigation), will be eliminated. 
This means that in the case of violations, remedies or redress can be sought against a corporate entity 
from or at every or any jurisdiction where it has corporate existence.326 
This treaty should also elaborate on the ‘sphere of influence’ concept under the GPs and need to use 
the conduct of Human Rights Due Diligence (HRDD) and Impact Assessments (HRIAs) by a parent 
company to deduce the full extent of its subsidiaries impacts on Human Rights. The requirement to 
conduct the HRDDs and HRIAs should be developed as a compulsory requirement that raises a 
conclusive legal presumption that a parent company knows the full extent of the impacts the business 
activities of its subsidiary have on human rights. The expectation based on the concept of ‘sphere of 
influence’, is that such parent companies owe a binding duty/responsibility (under this binding 
instrument) to leverage on their sphere of influence over the subsidiary, to straighten or streamline 
the subsidiary’s activities to become human rights compliant.  
The corollary therefore becomes that the hackneyed legalistic argument of separate legal personalities 
(of a parent company from its subsidiary company) will no longer suffice to limit or absolve a parent 
company from liability for human rights violations by its subsidiary. This is based on the presumption 
that the parent company knows (or ought to know) the full extent of its subsidiary’s activities and the 
impact that its operations have on human rights (because of the HRDD and HRIA it is expected to 
conduct). Consequently, its failure to properly apply its sphere of influence to remedy such adverse 
human rights impacts, under this proposed binding regime, should amount to a breach of its legal 
responsibility. To this end, as opposed to the separate legal personality defence; the proper and diligent 
 
326 See Treaty Alliance’s elaboration of this concept in their report titled ‘Enhance the International Legal Framework to 
Protect Human Rights from Corporate Abuse’ available online here 
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53da9e43e4b07d85121c5448/t/590a4cd029687f2f54e6519c/1493847249469/
2nd+Statement.pdf> Last accessed on 21st May 2019 
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use of its sphere of influence as described above will then be what limits a parent company from 
incurring liability for any violations of the human rights of third parties by their subsidiaries.  
The recent and pending business-related human rights cases in the UK such as Vedenta327 and Okpabi328 
would have proceeded on their merits without the rigours and encumbrances posed by geographic 
and jurisdictional challenges, had this model of binding regime being recommended here been in force.  
4.2 Recommendations Towards Attaining Socio-Economic Justice in the Niger Delta 
The greatest challenge to attaining socio-economic justice for the Niger Delta people is the aura of 
invincibility that the lax regulatory and enforcement praxis of the Nigerian state has bestowed on the 
oil MNCs and TNCs. It is submitted that once the jurisdictional/territorial barriers to regulation and 
enforcement are broken, as is being recommended here, corporate entities operating in the Niger 
Delta will sit-up, even to the extent of self-regulating. 
Aside the hurdle of the considerable high cost involved in bringing extra-territorial litigation, the 
model accountability mechanism recommended here holds the best promise for entrenching real and 
practical change in the conduct of business corporations in the Niger Delta. However, a good way to 
go around the encumbrance of cost is to include in any such binding legal instrument on Business and 
Human Rights, that the state’s duty to protect, vis-à-vis their duty to provide access to remedy, also 
includes a duty to provide legal aid. 
 
327 Lungowe & Ors v Vedenta & Anor [2019] UKSC 20 in which Lord Briggs (with whom all the other Law Lords agreed) 
held (obiter) while deciding the jurisdictional challenge mounted by the parent company/Appellant, Vedenta on grounds 
of forum convenience; that 1. The categories of cases where a parent company might owe a duty of care to third parties 
harmed by the activities of its subsidiaries transcends the two circumstances where the parent company (a) has effectively 
taken over management of, or (b) given relevant advice to the subsidiary as was propounded by Lord Justice Sales in AAA 
v Unilever PLc [2018] EWCA Civ 1532) and 2. That the consideration of where access to substantive justice will avail a 
litigant trumps all the other considerations in determining the appropriate forum to try cases involving parent company 
and its subsidiary domiciled in different jurisdictions. 
328 HRH Emere Godwin Okpabi v Shell [2018] EWCA Civ 191 
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While keeping the hope and faith for the emergence of this binding instrument, and in the manner 
and form believed to best serve the justice of the situation under study, here are some other 
recommendations that can ameliorate the present Niger Delta socio-economic problems in the 
interim. 
There is a need to urgently and rigorously amend some of the national pieces of legislation relevant to 
this discourse. The two prominent (or notorious) ones are the Land Use Act and the Companies and 
Allied Matters Act (CAMA). 329  
The Land Use Act has been shown to be a major obstacle to the full enjoyment of the relevant rights 
by the people of Niger Delta. Its constitutional status makes working around it hugely problematic. It 
is therefore recommended that the Act be amended and extricated of its constitutional status so that 
the process of its repeal and amendment is made less onerous and more plausible. This way, the 
offensive and repressive parts of the Act can be surgically repealed or at least, amended. Such 
amendments will be a big step towards the attainment of the Article 21 rights (and other rights) under 
the African Charter for the Niger Delta people and communities. 
Under CAMA. nowhere in its current eighteen (18) parts in force and in the bill seeking to repeal and 
re-enact it, is mention made of the term ‘human rights’. In other words, none of the 18 parts of the 
CAMA has a provision placing a responsibility on business entities to respect human rights A cursory 
reading of the preamble to Part X of the current Act; “protection of minorities against illegal and 
oppressive conducts” may (mis)lead one to think that this is a provision that lends itself to the 
protection of human rights. However, it only provides for the protection of ‘minority shareholders’ 
from any illegal or oppressive conducts of the majority.330 
 
329 Cap C 59; Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. This is the piece of legislation in Nigeria that governs most things 
relating to business corporations, from their incorporation, to their powers, rights, duties and obligations. 
330 See sections 299 to 330 
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In the light of these shortcomings, and the important role the statute plays in the regulation and 
conduct of corporations in Nigeria generally, it is important to take full advantage of the ongoing (or 
future) repeal and amendment of the Act, to insert pro-human rights protective clauses and provisions. 
For instance, sections 314 and 315 that provides for grounds upon which a corporation may be 
investigated can be altered to include allegations of human rights violations as one of them. It should 
also widen the category of persons who can request investigation of a company in section 314, to 
include “members of the public, in the public interest” on grounds or concerns of human rights 
violations. The statute should empower the corporate regulatory agency, the Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC), to ensure human rights compliance via mechanisms such as fines, bringing 
criminal and civil actions against human rights infringing corporations and up to dissolution of the 
corporation for the more egregious violations or abuses.   
The Nigerian Government also needs to pursue key reforms in the Legal Aid to provide funding for 
business related human rights litigations, as an offshoot of their duty to protect. It also needs to extend 
such reforms to the Nigerian Legal Aid Council itself, to enhance access to, as well as improve the 
quality and standard of the assistance rendered by, the council. It is also recommended that the 
requisite declaration recognizing the competence of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
to receive and adjudicate cases of Nigerian citizens be made by the Nigerian state so as to widen 
options and access for victims.331 
Lastly and in the light of various policy gaps highlighted, government should in the meantime, step up 
effort to develop a National Action Plan/legislation on business and human rights, that 
comprehensively addresses the socio-economic injustice in the Niger Delta, in line with the UN 
 
331 See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court of 
Human and Peoples’ Rights; Articles 5, 6 and 34  
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framework and the Guiding Principles. The passage of the relevant provisions of the long-proposed 
Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) should be expedited as they hold significant promises for the alleviation 
of some of the root problems of socio-economic injustice in the region.332  
The National Judicial Council (NJC) should ensure (as an appointment, training and retraining policy) 
that there is a sizable number of judges and applicants to judicial offices who have extensive knowledge 
and practice of (international) human rights law.333 This is to ensure that the Judiciary has capable 
hands who can understand human rights beyond the minimalist provisions contained in the 
fundamental rights section (chapter 4) of the Nigerian constitution and who can show an appreciation 
of the plights and consequences faced as a result of the activities of the oil TNCs, by the people of 
Niger Delta in their interpretation and application of the law in this circumstance. 
All these measures, if applied, are more likely to ensure greater accountability on the part of the 
corporations for the adverse impacts of their activities on human rights generally. This is because the 
measures recommended are bound to enhance shareholders’ approach to regulation; which is a 
regulation evenly exercised by both government, the corporations themselves, civil society 
organizations  and most importantly, the vulnerable people most at risk of rights violations on 
accounts of the activities of business entities, such as the Niger Delta indigenes as they suffer the 
blights and brunt of these adverse impacts first hand. The principal advantage of the model treaty 
advocated here is that it liberalizes, through this universal/extra-territorial enforcement paradigm, the 
onus of regulation such that a failure, refusal or abdication of governments/states on accounts of the 
debilitating TREMF paradigm, will no longer prove fatal to the objective of ensuring corporate 
accountability for human rights violations.  
 
332such as establishment of ‘Petroleum Host Communities Fund’ and ‘Environmental Remediation Fund’  
333 NJC is Nigeria’s Judicial Appointment body 
96 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
CASE LAW 
Nigerian Case Law 
Abioya v Yakubu [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt 190) 130. 
Adetona and Ors v Igele General Enterprises [2011] 7 NWLR. 
Allar Irou v Shell B.P. [1971] Unreported Suit No. W/89/71. 
Dokubo Asari v Federal Republic of Nigeria [2006] SC 208. 
Federal Republic of Nigeria v Hon. Justice Walter S.N. Onnorghen [2019]. 
Grace Jack v Federal University of Agric. Makurdi [2004] 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 208. 
Henry Okah v Federal Republic of Nigeria [2007] on charge No. FHC/ABJ/ Cr/ 178/2007. 
Oronto Douglas v Shell [1999] 2 NWLR prt 591. 
Shell v Isaiah [2011] 11 NWLR (Pt. 723) 168. 
 
Non-Nigerian Case Law  
AAA v Unilever PLc [2018] EWCA Civ 1532. 
Anvil Mining Ltd. V Association Canadienne Contre L’Impunite N°500-09-021701-115. 
Biwater Gauff Ltd. v Government of Tanzania [2006] ICSID Case No ARB/05/22 IIC 82. 
Bodo Community & Others v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nig Ltd [2014] EWHC 2170 (TCC). 
HRH Emere Godwin Bebe Okpabi & Others v Royal Dutch Shell & Anor [2017] EWHC 89 (TCC).  
97 
 
Jesner v Arab Bank [2018] 16-499, 584 US. 
Khulumani v Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd [2007] 504 F.3d 254, 264 (2nd Cir). 
Kiobel v Royal Dutch Shell BP [2013] CO., 569 US 108. 
Lungowe & Ors v Vedenta & Anor [2019] UKSC 20. 
 
LEGISLATION 
Nigerian Legislation 
Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act (1988). 
Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules (2009). 
National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency Act (2007). 
National Oil Spill Detection and Response Act (2006). 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights Act (Ratification and Enforcement Act, Cap A9, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria (2004). 
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) (As amended). 
The Companies and Allied Matters Act (1990). 
The Land Use Act (1978). 
The Petroleum Industry Bill (2011). 
The Petroleum Industry Governance Act (2018). 
 
 
98 
 
Non-Nigerian Legislation 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court of Human. 
.and Peoples’ Rights, (2016), Articles 5, 6 and 34. 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (1981). 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).  
The United Nations Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979). 
 
BOOKS 
Abidde Sabella, Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Militancy, Amnesty and the Postamnesty Environment (Lexington 
London, 2017) Print.  
Barry Brian, The Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical Examination of the principal doctrines in a Theory of Justice 
by John Rawls (OUP 1973) Print. 
Baxi Upendra, The Future of Human Rights (New Delhi 2002) Print. 
Karp David J., Responsibility for Human Rights, Transnational Corporations in Imperfect States’, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014) Print. 
Khoury Stefanie & Whyte David, Corporate Human Rights Violations (Routledge, 2017) Print. 
Kukathas Chandran and Petit Philip, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics’ (Blackwell 1990) Print. 
99 
 
Nolan Justine & Baumann-Pauly Dorothee (ed), Business and Human Rights from Principles to Practice 
(Routledge London & New York, 2016) Print. 
Nozick Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford, 1974) Print. 
Oludoro Olubayo, Oil Exploitation and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities 1st 
edn (Intersentia 2014) Print. 
Okonto Ike, The Lingering Crisis in Nigeria’s Niger Delta and Suggestions for a Peaceful Resolution (Centre for 
Democracy and Development 2000) 
Rawls John, A Theory of Justice Rev edn (Harvard University Press, 1999) Print. 
JOURNAL ARTICLES 
Abe Oyeniyi, “The Feasibility of Implementing the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights in the Extractive Industry in Nigeria” (2016) 7 J Sustainable Dev L & Pol’y 137. 
Ako Rhuks, ‘Nigeria’s Land Use Act: An Anti-thesis to Environmental Justice’ (2009) JAL (2). 
Adewumi Afolasade & Adeniyi Olatunbosun “Enhancing Stakeholder Participation in the Niger Delta 
Region: The Potential Contributions of the ILO Convention 169” (2015) 6 J Sustainable Dev L & 
Pol’y 129. 
Baxi Upendra “Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights’ (1998) 8 Transnat'l L. & 
Contemp Probs 125. 
Bittle Steven & Snider Laureen, ‘Examining the Ruggie Report: can voluntary guidelines tame global 
capitalism?’ in Critical Criminology, (2013) vol. 21. 
Blitt Robert, “Beyond Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Charting an 
Embracive Approach to Corporate Human Rights Compliance” (2012) 38:1 TILJ. 
100 
 
Cata-Backer Larry “On the Evolution of the United Nations’ ‘Protect-Respect-Remedy’ Project: The 
State, the Corporation and Human Rights in a Global Governance Context” (2011) 9 Santa Clara 
Journal of International Law 37. 
Davidheiser Mark & Nyiayaana Kialee, “Demobilization or Remobilization? The Amnesty Program 
and the Search for Peace in the Niger Delta’”(2010) African Security Journal. 
Dworkin Ronald “Equality of Resources” In What is Equality cap 2 (1981) 10:4 Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 283 – 345. 
Ebeku Kaniye S A “Oil and the Niger Delta People in International Law” Resource Rights, Environmental 
and Equity Issues (2006). 
Ebeku Kaniye S A “Biodiversity Conservation in Nigeria: An Appraisal of the Legal Regime in 
Relation to the Niger Delta Area of the Country”, 16(3) Journal of Environmental Law (2004): 361-
75, at 366. 
Egede Hephzibah & Egede Edwin “The Force of the Community in the Niger Delta of Nigeria: 
Propositions for New Oil and Gas Legal and Contractual Arrangements’, 25 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 
45, 88 (2016) at 57. 
Edu O.K.  “Corporate Social Responsibility: The Case of Multinational Oil Companies in the Niger 
Delta of Nigeria” (2011) 23 Sri Lanka J Int’l L 101. 
Ezeudu Martin-Joe, “Revisiting Corporate Violations of Human Rights in Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
Region: Canvassing the Potential Role of the International Criminal Court” (2011) 11:23 Afr Hum Rts 
LJ. 
Ihonvbere Julius “Economic Crisis, Structural Adjustment and Social Crisis in Nigeria” World 
Development 21.   
101 
 
Kagan Robert, Thornton Dorothy & Gunningham Neil “Explaining Corporate Environmental 
Performance: How Does Regulation Matter” (2003) Law & Society Review, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp 22-29. 
Michalowski Raymond and Kramer Ronald “The Space Between the Laws: The Problem of Corporate 
Crime in a Transnational Context” In Social Problem (1987) 34:1 pp 34 -53. 
Morag-Levine Noga “Abortion in Israel: Community, Rights and the Context of Compromise” (1994) 
Law & Society Review, Vol 28, No 5. 
Mosley Paul “Policy-Making without Facts: A Note on the Assessment of Structural Adjustment 
Policies in Nigeria, 1985-1990” (1992) African Affairs 91, pp 227-240 at pp 228-230. 
Muchlinski Peter, “Implementing the New UN Corporate Human Rights Framework: Implications 
for Corporate Law, Governance and Regulations” (2012) 22:1 Business Ethics Quarterly p145-177.  
Mutua Makau, "Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights" (2001) Harv. Int'l L.J 
41:1 
Okafor Obiora “Assessing Baxi’s Thesis on an Emergent Trade-Related Market-Friendly Human 
Rights Paradigm: Evidence from Nigerian Labour-led Struggles” 2007 (1) Law, Social Justice & 
Global Development Journal (LGD). 
Oshionebo Evaristus “Stabilization Clauses in Natural Resource Extraction Contracts: Legal, 
Economic and Social Implications for Developing Countries” (2010) 10 Asper Rev Int’l Bus & Trade 
L 1. 
Shelton Dinah “Decision Regarding Communication 155/96 (Social and Economic Rights 
Action/Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria)” (2002) 96 A J I L 937. 
Simons Penelope, “International Law’s Invisible Hand and the Future of Corporate Accountability 
for Violations of Human Rights” (2012) 3:1 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 5–43. 
102 
 
Stevens Lisa “The Illusion of Sustainable Development: How Nigeria’s Environmental Laws are 
Failing the Niger Delta” (2011) 36:2 Vt. L Rev 387. 
Zalik Anna “Oil 'Futures': Shell’s Scenarios and the Social Constitution of the Global 
Oil Market” (2009) 41 GEOFORUM 553, 558.  
Zerial N, “Reflections on the United Nations Human Rights Norms for Corporations” (2007) 25:1 
Companies and Securities Law Journal 30. 
 
ONLINE MATERIALS 
Adangor Zacchaeus “The Petroleum Industry Bill 2012 and the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: 
Panacea or Placebo” (2015) 38 JL Pol’y & Globalization Online 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331684836_The_Petroleum_Industry_Bill_2012_and_
the_Niger_Delta_Region_of_Nigeria_Panacea_or_Placebo> 
Agbo Anayochukwu, “Isaac Adaka-Boro, The Seven-Day Revolution in Nigeria” (3rd February 2018) 
Online <http://kayodeogundamisi.blogspot.ca/2008/02/issac-adaka-boro-seven-dat-
revolution.html> 
Amnesty International, ‘Nigeria: Pollution has created Human Rights Tragedy in the Niger Delta’ 
(Abuja, June 2009) available here <https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2009/06/nigeria-
amnesty-international-says-pollution-has-created-human-rights-tr/> Accessed 18th February 2018 
Bisong Anthony Oso, The Effects of Natural Gas Flaring on Climate Change in Nigeria (Society of Petroleum 
Engineers, 2014); “Gas Flaring and Global Warming”, online: http://www.global-greenhouse-
warming.com/gas-flaring-and-global-warming.html 
103 
 
Central Bank of Nigeria, “Annual Report 2015” (Abuja, 2015) available here 
<https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2017/RSD/Annual%20Report%202015.pdf>  at 112. 
Deva Surya 'Treating human rights lightly: A critique of the consensus rhetoric and the language 
employed by the Guiding Principles', online: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287055480_Treating_human_rights_lightly_A_critique_
of_the_consensus_rhetoric_and_the_language_employed_by_the_Guiding_Principles>  
Leton G. B., “The Ogoni Bill of Rights” (1991) Online <http://www.bebor.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Ogoni-Bill-of-Rights.pdf> accessed 18th January 2018. 
“Environmental Report of Ogoniland” United Nations Environment Programme Online 
<http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/CountryOperations/Nigeria/EnvironmentalAssessm
entofOgonilandreport/tabid/54419/Default.aspx> Accessed March 16th 2016 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation “History of the Nigerian Petroleum Industry” Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (30th March 2016) online at <www.nnpcgroup.com> 
National Petroleum Policy  (supra) Available at < http://www.petroleumindustrybill.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/National-Petroleum-Policy-Approved-by-FEC-in-July-2017.pdf> 
Accessed 20th January 2018 
Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation, “Oil and Gas Statistics” (Accessed 18th December 2017) 
Online < http://nnpcgroup.com/PublicRelations/OilandGasStatistics.aspx>  
Nigeria, Ministry of Petroleum Resources, ‘National Petroleum Policy’ (20th January 2018) at 41 
Available at < http://www.petroleumindustrybill.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/National-
Petroleum-Policy-Approved-by-FEC-in-July-2017.pdf>  
104 
 
“Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta” (London, 2009) Amnesty International: 
Report of the Niger Delta Technical Committee  
 “Nigeria’s GDP Positive Signals for 2017” PriceWaterhouseCoopers (London 2017) Online < 
https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/assets/pdf/economy-alert-march-2017.pdf> accessed January 28th 
2018 
 “Nigeria Biannual Economic Update No 1 2017” The World Bank (10th January 2018) Online 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/349511494584937819/pdf/114996-WP-P163291-
PUBLIC-NEUNoFinalfromPublisher.pdf>  
Nliam Sylvester Oscar, ‘International Oil and Gas Environmental Legal Framework and the 
Precautionary Principle: the Implications for the Niger Delta’ [2014] 22 African Journal of 
International Comparative Law available < 
http://www.euppublishing.com/action/doSearch?AllField=Sylvester+Oscar+Nliam&x=6&y=4> 
accessed 8th March 2016 
Nwanya Stephen C, “Climate change and energy implications of gas flaring for Nigeria” (2011) 6:3 Int 
J Low-Carbon Tech 193, online: <https://academic.oup.com/ijlct/article/6/3/193/680774>. 
Shemberg A “Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights: A Research Project Conducted for IFC and 
the United Nations Special Representative to the Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights” 
(2008)www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/p_StabilizationClausesandHumanRights/
$FILE/Stabilization+Paper.pdf> (accessed 3 September 2011). 
 Omadjohwoefe Samuel Ogege, “Amnesty Initiative and the Dilemma of Sustainable Development in 
the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria” (2011) 4:4 Journal of Sustainable Development 249, online: 
<http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jsd/article/view/10634>. 
105 
 
Rajagopal Balakrishnan, “Pro-Human Rights but Anti-Poor? A Critical Evaluation of the Indian 
Supreme Court from a Social Movement Perspective” (2007) 8:3 Hum Rights Rev 157, online: 
<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12142-007-0004-8>. 
Ruggie John Gerrard “Quo Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and Human Rights Treaty Sponsors 
- Commentary |”, online: <https://www.ihrb.org/other/treaty-on-business-human-rights/quo-
vadis-unsolicited-advice-to-business-and-human-rights-treaty-sponsors>. 
See ‘Report of Recent Oil Spills in Delta and Bayelsa States Nigeria’, 
<https://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/recent-oil-spills-in-delta-and-bayelsa-states-nigeria/>  
accessed 5th May 2018 
See World Bank’s Report on Top 30 Flaring Countries 2013-2016 available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/gasflaringreduction#7 accessed 8 April 2017  
See this newspaper report on the deliberations relating to the Gas Flaring Prohibition Bill 2017 before 
the Nigerian National Assembly available here< https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/06/nigeria-
accounts-40-gas-flared-annually-africa-senate/>  accessed 25th May 2018 
See a Report by Human Rights Watch on the incident, available at 
<https://www.hrw.org/legacy/press/1999/dec/nibg1299.htm> Accessed January 15th 2018.  
See the News Conference by the Hydrocarbon Pollution Remediation Project (HYPREP) on the  
See this Guardian Newspaper report for instance available here <https://guardian.ng/opinion/the-
threat-by-Niger Delta-avengers/> and accessed on April 10th 2018 
Lugard S B “The clash of property and environmental rights in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria | 
Lugard | Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy (The)”, online: 
<https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jsdlp/article/view/140512>. 
 “The State of the States” BidgIT (2015) Online <http://www.yourbudgit.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/THE-FATE-OF-STATES-Final1.pdf> Accessed on January 18th 2018 
106 
 
 “The Niger Delta | No Democratic Dividend”, (22 October 2002), online: Human Rights Watch 
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2002/10/22/Niger Delta/no-democratic-dividend>. 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, “Nigeria facts and figures” (18th December 2018) 
Online <https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm> 
The World Bank, ‘Nigeria Structural Adjustment Program: Policies, Implementation and Impact (May, 
1994) at vii available here 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/959091468775569769/pdf/multi0page.pdf> 
accessed 10th May 2018 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ 
(New York and Geneva 2011) at p.1 Available at 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf>  last 
accessed on January 26th 2018 
UNHRCOR, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights: Report 
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General [SRSG] on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie’ (2008) UN Doc 
A/HRC/8/5 At 3. 
United Nations Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 (25 June 2014)  
See Also Commission on Human Rights, ‘Report on the Sixtieth Session (!5th March – 23rd April 
2003)’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/127, Part 1, ch. 42, p. 28, para. C 
Treaty Alliance’s elaboration of this concept in their report titled ‘Enhance the International Legal 
Framework to Protect Human Rights from Corporate Abuse’ available online here 
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53da9e43e4b07d85121c5448/t/590a4cd029687f2f54e6519
c/1493847249469/2nd+Statement.pdf> Last accessed on 21st May 2019. 
